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Synopsis 
 
Money laundering has increased in scope and is believed to contribute to disruption of the 
financial system and uphold drug trade, trafficking of women and children for commercial 
sex, weapon smuggling, and terrorist financing. It is not only conducted by traditional 
criminals, but is often assisted by corrupt financial institution officials. The expansion of 
finance capitalism allowed for worldwide capital flows in a weakly regulated financial 
system. Financial havens and electronic payment technologies supporting anonymous 
customer relations have in turn offered opportunities to launder illicit proceeds without raising 
suspicion from public authorities. 
 
In the late 1980s an international anti money laundering (AML) offensive was initiated. 
Under direction of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), international standards have been 
developed and adopted within many countries’ national policy frameworks. The terrorist 
attacks of September 11th 2001 gave rise to a policy u-turn in international AML. Whereas 
collaboration before this incident centred on tracing criminal money after crime commitment, 
post-September 11th 2001 collaboration took on a preventive risk-based approach seeking to 
predict possible terrorist attacks.  
 
This thesis examines money laundering and AML techniques, drawing on ideas from the 
science, technology and society (STS) tradition. It explains the driving forces behind 
enhanced international action against the problem and demonstrates that an international 
AML regime has emerged. The regime possesses the features of a technological system, and 
this influences AML policies. The analytical framework combines three approaches of regime 
theory with Thomas P. Hughes’ theory of technological systems. 
 
The various approaches are both competing and complementing and prevail at different stages 
of the regime process. Regime formation is explained by US hegemony, suitable with the 
power based approach. Regime maintenance centres around the work of the FATF and is 
rooted in the recognition that fighting money laundering in a collaborative manner is more 
beneficial than negotiating several bilateral agreements, which is consistent with the interest 
based approach. International AML is influenced by expert knowledge. This expert 
knowledge can be explained both by epistemic communities exemplary of knowledge based 
theories, and by technical authority exemplary of the technological systems approach.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  money laundering - electronic payment technologies - cyberpayments - 
financial havens - secrecy - transparency - AML - FATF - international regime 
technological system  
     
Preface 
 
“Scholars of international political economy have been slow to show interest in the study of 
illicit activity in global finance. Particularly neglected has been a focus on the response of 
states to the growth of this activity”  -Eric Helleiner, 1999  
 
This thesis investigates the response of countries to money laundering. Having been interested 
in the topic for quite a while, I was happy to realize that it could be a relevant subject for my 
Master Dissertation.  
 
In October 2003 my sister called to tell me that judge Eva Joly was going to give a lecture 
about financial crimes at the Oslo University College Faculty of Journalism and Information 
Science. With a borrowed admittance card I snuck in and attended the lecture. It left me with 
great inspiration to dive into the subject and investigate it further. When I was given a go-
ahead tone that this could be an appropriate topic for an ESST Master Dissertation from the 
coordinator of my second semester specialization, the wheels started spinning. 
 
The journey from thesis outline to final product has been challenging and I indeed enjoyed the 
ride. I would like to thank the following people for their support, help and inspiration: 
 
the SAS Institute AS who allowed me to attend their money laundering seminar early in May, 
where I came into contact with several of my interviewees; the people who kindly took time 
from their working hours to be interviewed; my supervisor post.doc. Bent Sofus Tranøy for 
keeping me on a leash and without whose advice and insight I probably would be very lost; 
my boyfriend for proofreading and much needed support and encouragement when things 
looked the worst; my father-in-law for proofreading and useful comments; my sister for 
indirectly giving me the idea of my master topic; my fellow first and second semester ESST 
students for a good time during a good year both socially and professionally, and in particular 
Anne-Grethe Sandvik for good advice and moral support.   
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1 Introduction 
From late 1995 until 1999, as a vice president of Bank of New York, I agreed with my 
husband, Peter Berlin, and other people and entities to set up accounts at the Bank of 
New York for three entities, Benex, BECS and Lowland, for various purposes which 
were illegal under United States law. I did so to facilitate the movement of funds into 
and out of Russia, and to accomplish a number of objects which either knew were 
unlawful or deliberately closed my eyes to that I had reason to know was unlawful 
activity. I personally undertook various acts in order to further this illegal agreement.... 
In these transactions, I acted to benefit myself and my husband, and to develop more 
Russian business for the Eastern European Division of the Bank of New York. 
- Former Senior Vice President of the Bank of New York Lucy Edwards’ admissions to money laundering crimes 
in Manhattan Federal Court1.   
In 1998 the Bank of New York was put under investigation suspected of laundering 10 billion 
US Dollars for Russian organized crime networks via a company of which the executive 
manager was the Vice President of the Bank of New York Lucy Edwards’ husband. Edwards 
was the Eastern European Division Executive at the London branch reporting to the Eastern 
European Division Executive at the New York headquarters, Mrs. Kagalovskij. Her husband 
was at the time the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Director for Russia and 
Vice President of the Russian bank Menatep, which through a shell company bought up the 
Russian oil company Yukos. The American correspondent bank of Menatep was the Bank of 
New York, which made profit from giving its Russian counterpart and other Russian banks 
access to the United States stock market by offering customer secrecy. As the case cracked, 
attention was directed towards Mr. Kagalovskij, suspected of laundering large sums for the 
Russian mafia via shell companies in financial havens. This money supposedly involved loans 
from the IMF to strengthen the Russian economy. Although Edwards was fired from her Bank 
of New York position and pleaded guilty to money laundering and unlicensed banking 
activity, she has still not been sentenced2, allegedly because she forfeited parts of the proceeds 
gained from the operations and has contributed to the investigation process. 
                                                
1
 http://www.russianlaw.org/crisis.htm  
2
 http://www.nytid.no/print.php?id=429, http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/EM623.cfm  
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1.1 Money Laundering - The Scope of the Problem 
For criminals to benefit from illegally obtained funds, the money must be integrated into the 
financial system and given the appearance of being legally acquired to avoid raising suspicion 
from law enforcement. Money laundering is defined as “the processing of criminal proceeds 
in order to disguise their illegal origin”3. Although it obviously occurs outside normal 
economic statistics, the IMF estimates the sums laundered each year to be between two and 
five per cent of the global Gross Domestic Product (Gilmore 1999:21). By 1998 statistics this 
corresponds to sums ranging between 800 billion and 2 trillion US Dollars per year (Wechsler 
2001:45).  Money laundering is not a new phenomenon, but it has changed in the sense that it 
has increased in scope. The expansion of finance capitalism allows for world-wide capital 
flows in markets with few regulatory restrictions, a situation that can be exploited by actors 
involved in money laundering. A few transactions can move vast sums of money anywhere 
around the globe in the time it takes to press a few computer keys. The funds can then be 
concealed in financial havens operating with strategies of secrecy and anonymity, preventing 
governments from tracing dirty money.  
     The Bank of New York scandal is an example of sophisticated money laundering and 
illustrates how money easily can be relocated between bank accounts and jurisdictions via 
shell companies in financial havens. Accomplishment of the money transfers naturally 
involved dependence upon Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and more 
exactly on payment technologies4, and this is an example on how these technologies can be 
used in money laundering schemes. The scandal additionally reveals the actuality and 
presence of money laundering in an environment of poorly regulated law enforcement 
systems and corrupt financial officials exploiting banks to facilitate their own misdeeds, as 
represented by the top Bank of New York executives. This points in the direction of a lawless 
                                                
3
 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, available: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/40Recs-1996_en.htm  
4
 ”Payment technologies” will in this thesis refer to technologies supporting electronic transfer of value. 
 3 
business culture undermining public confidence in national financial systems. The large sums 
laundered each year naturally call for an acceleration of countermeasures. Money laundering 
is recognized as a great problem requiring great response and has consequently become a top 
priority of the financial service industry and the authorities in most developed countries. The 
coordination of international anti-money laundering (henceforward AML) seems to be 
emerging within a formalized framework, leading to a set of questions that are central to this 
dissertation: Are international money laundering countermeasures coordinated enough to be 
labelled an international AML regime? If this is the case, then what are the main drivers 
behind the last decades’ growth in international efforts to curtail the problem? With regard to 
its ubiquity and globalisation, it is possible to identify a dual role of ICTs, without which the 
current money laundering dissemination most probably would be considerably less effective. 
How to these technologies, represented by electronic financial transaction technologies, serve 
both as facilitators of, and an auxiliary for fighting money laundering? The latter suggests that 
the technologies in question are attached to governmental needs and desires and must be 
treated as something socially embedded. Such indication of the technical characteristics of 
international countermeasures finally raises the question if the features of international AML 
are identifiable with a technological system. Does this affect AML policies? 
1.2 Money Laundering Countermeasures- The Scope of Response 
to the Problem 
Since the late 1980s concerted action has been taken in large parts of the world to build 
coordinated international initiatives to combat money laundering as threats posed by 
international drug trade became a central issue of concern (Gilmore 1999:13). Initiated by two 
landmarks in 1988, the Vienna Convention and the Basle Committee Statement of Principles, 
both grounded in US concerns with increased trade in narcotics and abuse of the banking 
system for the purpose of money laundering respectively, a growing network of states and 
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international bodies including the UN, the OECD and the EU has established common 
regulatory international AML standards. Perhaps the most important achievement has been 
the G7’s5 creation of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), the 
most important contributor to international AML in charge of developing and promoting 
policies to combat money laundering by bringing together the policy-making power of legal, 
financial and law enforcement experts (Carlson 2000:129). Achieved establishments comprise 
institution building and cooperation in adopting investigation, prosecution and prevention 
techniques including reporting requirements of suspicious transactions, record-keeping and 
information sharing built on an underlying principle of transparency. Implementation of 
established standards is encouraged through peer pressure, technical assistance and 
monitoring, and sanctioning methods are employed if AML requirements are not complied 
with (130). A method that was conducted by the FATF in this respect was a naming and 
shaming strategy in 2000 pushing through regulatory compliance on non-cooperating actors. 
This black-listing was however abandoned by 2003 (Sharman 2004:1). Countermeasures have 
been additionally enhanced after the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 in New York and 
Washington. When linkages were discovered between money laundering and the financing of 
international terrorism the commissions of the FATF were immediately expanded. Since then 
international AML has taken on a new form through the war on terror, grounded in a desire to 
control the uncontrollable: to predict possible terrorist attacks that are by their nature 
unpredictable (de Goede 2004:3). This new way of targeting money laundering and terrorist 
financing builds on preventive surveillance of financial transactions inter alia as to detect 
anomalies (de Goede 2004). Such a predictive technological intelligence strategy is a product 
exemplary of the risk society6. Apart from assessing possible terrorist attacks, the objectives 
behind international countermeasures are to remove profit from criminals by denying them 
                                                
5
 Although the G7 has been changed to the G8, G7 will be the term employed in this thesis. 
6
 The concept of  “risk society” refers to the idea that society is exposed to socially created risks. 
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the ability to launder illicit gains, and to identify and prosecute them, based on the assumption 
that criminals will not want to take the risks involved if they do not benefit from their actions 
(Carlson 2000:128). It is however a controversial issue due to the trouble of finding the 
balance between a legitimate minimum of participation by all parties and a strong enough 
element of top-down policy from powerful states to make it successful (Tranøy 2003:4).  
1.3 Motivation: Money Laundering in Context  
The reasons for targeting money laundering include a wide range of negative impacts not only 
on the economy, but on society in general. The IMF stresses that money laundering leads to 
“inexplicable changes in money demand, greater risks to bank soundness, contamination of 
legal financial transactions, and greater volatility of international capital flows and exchange 
rates” (Wechsler 2001:45). Economic effects are not the only reasons for concern. An 
underlying worry is the encouragement of corruption and bribery giving criminals influence 
in banking institutions (Tsingou 2004:4). For laundered money to enter the legal financial 
system, it is often necessary to bribe bank officials to avoid law enforcement suspicion. This 
complicates unveiling of the affair, since lack of information sharing hampers detection. 
Detecting money laundering gets even more hampered when banking officials are themselves 
part of the game. The Bank of New York story illustrates this. Top executives of 
acknowledged financial institutions7 exploited legal financial structures for personal gains 
through corrupt behaviour. Such corruption of credible institutions leads to a loss of 
honourable authority in the financial sector, which is an unwanted situation in an international 
environment where increased cooperation based on information sharing is considered a 
necessity in preventing financial crimes. As reflected in the expanded commissions of the 
FATF after September 11th 2001, money laundering also poses problems to national security 
                                                
7
 The term refers to persons or entities conducting deposit acceptance, lending, leasing, transfer of money or 
value, issuing means of payment, diverse trading and other financial commitment as a business for or on behalf 
of a customer. For a more detailed definition see appendix C. 
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because of the alleged linkages to international terrorism. This indicates a change in the nature 
of international security politics, moving from purely military questions towards the inclusion 
of economic issues of concern. 
     AML initiatives must also be seen in relation to the violent crimes often underlying money 
laundering. The recognition of the establishment of a global network of criminal activities is 
often referred to in a collective term as a “criminalization syndrome”. The term treats 
transnational organized crime including drug trafficking, trafficking of women and children 
for commercial sex, arms trafficking, illegal markets, corruption, rent-seeking and money 
laundering as closely related and mutually reinforcing phenomena (Williams & Baudin-
O’Hayon 2002:128). The growth in organized crime has made money laundering an important 
part of the game, since criminal proceeds must be concealed. The criminal element to money 
laundering is thus twofold in the sense that it stems from a crime and enables criminal activity 
to be maintained8.  
1.4 Objectives and Research Question  
Money laundering has increased in scope and taken on new forms. In many cases this 
diminishes reliance upon corrupt financial officials, partly because internet banking from 
home reduces the role of face-to-face contact and removes third party liabilities. Legal 
financial transactions have a link between the funds and the persons involved. Money 
launderers therefore desist from using normal payment systems and rely on cash, which offers 
anonymity (Molander et al. 1998a:5). But physical movement of large amounts of cash is 
risky, and advances in payment technologies can remove this burden. “Cyberpayments” is a 
collective term for these new techniques describing a “class of instruments and payment 
systems that support the electronic transfer of value”, which can take place via the internet or 
through stored value smart cards (11). They reduce transaction costs and increase transaction 
                                                
8
 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/MLaundering_en.htm.  
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efficiency, but are vulnerable to exploitation by criminals. The global nature of these systems 
also enables criminals to take advantage of different national regulations; however, this does 
not imply that laundering money is easy. On the contrary, enhanced regulation and 
coordinated international response to the problem increases the costs and risks of money 
launderers to continue their activities, and as these countermeasures reach wider geographical 
circumference, there will be fewer loopholes to exploit. Moreover, AML participants use 
payment technologies as a source of information, and rules requiring surveillance of 
transaction technologies have been implemented in many countries. In particular, AML after 
September 11th 2001 defer to intensive surveillance technologies based on financial 
transactions designed to intercept suspicious activity. This leads to the main objectives of this 
thesis which are to: 
• Investigate if international AML can be identified as an international regime, which 
also possesses the features of a technological system that influences AML policies 
• Present the driving forces behind the last decades’ increased coordinated international 
initiatives to curtail money laundering 
• Demonstrate that developments in ICTs play a dual role in the sense that they are used 
both for the purpose of money laundering, as will be demonstrated by the techniques 
and strategies involved, and for the purpose of combating it, as is evident by the 
technical character of international AML 
 
These objectives can be summed up in the following research question:  
Can international AML efforts be identified as an international regime possessing the features 
of a technological system, and how can the proliferation of payment technologies can be used 
both to facilitate and fight money laundering? 
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1.5 Methodology 
The use of payment technologies in money laundering and AML schemes calls for the 
presence of ideas from the Science, Technology and Society (STS) school of thought. A view 
often put forward in the globalisation debate is that of technological determinism, which in its 
most extreme forms considers technology as something autonomous outside of social context 
causing social change (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1992:2). As such, electronic payment 
technologies have been blamed for causing money laundering to increase in scope. A counter 
argument is that it is not the technology itself that causes change, but the underlying social 
factors involved. This emphasis on the social embedding of and influence on technology is a 
fundamental principle in the STS literature (Wyatt 1998). It does not imply that technologies 
do not affect social change, but rather social structures such as social interaction, norms, 
needs and desires influence technological change by linking technology and society. To 
understand the dual role of ICTs in relation to money laundering, perspectives from the STS 
literature will be very helpful. In the AML context this means that international cooperation 
can be influenced by the underlying AML technologies used in pursuit of political goals and 
vice versa. The international project of combating money laundering is a complex issue, and 
comprises a myriad of international bodies and organizations. Despite their role as important 
contributors to international AML, all actors engaged in the AML campaign can not be 
emphasized in this thesis. Rather, importance will basically be attached to the bodies that are 
most relevant to the analysis. This does not mean that the excluded participants are less 
relevant; on the contrary, there are organizations that in certain areas have contributed more in 
the fight against money laundering than some of the bodies referred to here.  
     Engagement with the theoretical basis has been sought carried out following the guidelines 
of Chris Hart’s “Doing a literature Review” (1998).  In seeking a relevant theoretical 
framework for the analysis I ended up combining two different theories to explain the 
growing international response to money laundering. These are regime theory and the theory 
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of technological systems. Regime theory is a commonly acknowledged approach in the 
literature on global governance and international relations, and can be classified in three 
schools of thought explaining the driving forces behind international cooperation 
(Hasenclever et al. 1996:178). (1) Power-based realist approaches focus on the distribution of 
power resources between states. The core of this approach is the hypothesis of hegemonic 
stability, which emphasizes the crucial role of a strong dominating actor in international 
politics in order to realize collectively wanted outcomes. (2) Rationalist interest-based theory 
describes how international regimes help states realize common interests by serving as a tool 
for simplifying international cooperation through mutually adjusted behaviour useful to all 
parts. Finally, (3) knowledge-based theories placing discourse, ideas and learning at the centre 
see international regimes as a social phenomenon in which actors’ notion of the world is 
formed through international interaction (Stokke & Claes 2001). A commonly used definition 
developed by Krasner treats international regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations” (Hasenclever et al.1996:179). Taking into account the 
structure, diffusion and implications of international money laundering countermeasures, 
regime theory is highly relevant to the analysis.  
     A recent approach to international collaboration has been developed by Porter drawing on 
Hughes’ theory of technological systems, referring to a system of embedded knowledge 
created by people. In issue areas where such systems exist, these “can shape the conduct of 
actors involved in international institutions in ways that other approaches to international 
institutions, such as regime analysis, overlook” (Porter 2003:521). To illustrate this Porter 
refers to three features of technological systems that can shape actors’ conduct. These are 
material embedding, complex path dependence and technical authority. Porter’s approach does 
not oppose power-, interest- and knowledge-based theories, but focuses on how technical 
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features associated with technological systems can affect the way international politics operate, 
and is thus complimentary to traditional regime theory. It may be applied on international 
AML and seems particularly relevant in explaining the post September 11th 2001 risk based 
collaboration strategy characterized by a preventive search for unusual transaction activity 
based on technologies designed to detect anomalies. 
     The theoretical platform of the analysis combining traditional regime theory with Porter’s 
application of Hughes’ theory of technological systems enables me to give a thorough account 
of the driving forces behind, and a description of the characteristics of, coordinated 
international AML efforts. To understand the most commonly employed techniques used in 
money laundering processes, and techniques used to counter money laundering, it is necessary 
to study advances in ICTs developed for the financial system. Central to this is the already 
mentioned cyberpayment system including internet services and the use of payment cards, but 
also traditional banking transaction systems will be taken into account. It will be described how 
electronic payment technologies also can be used for the purpose of curtailing money 
laundering. To avoid adopting a position of technological determinism in this respect it will be 
central to emphasize the social embedding of these technologies, something that places me 
within the broader framework of the SCOT (the Social Construction of Technology) school.  
     The empirical basis of the thesis is to a large extent based on reports, papers and typologies 
carried out by the main international AML bodies. As a matter of course, taking the objectives 
of the thesis into account, it was useful to approach people working against money laundering 
on a daily basis. To reinforce the empirical data basis, I therefore conducted a series of 
qualitative interviews with AML professionals. Taking account of the time and resources 
available, the number of interviewees came down to seven. According to Hammersley and 
Atkinson, in ethnographic research the aim is often to select a sample of interviewees who are 
representative to the research. But a representative sample is not always the objective, 
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particularly in cases where the goal is to gather information rather than document 
perspectives. The aim of my interviews was precisely to “target those people who has the 
knowledge desired and who may be willing to divulge it to the ethnographer” (Hammersley & 
Atkinson 1995:137). All the informants were professionals engaged in combating money 
laundering, and their expertise offered an exclusive source of information. Their expertise as 
source of information is also a reason why it was not necessary to interview a large sample 
from which a comparative analysis could be conducted. To cover all aspects of my objectives, 
I selected two representatives from the technology sector engaged in the development of 
software solutions to unveil money laundering, two representatives from the law enforcement 
sector; one special adviser from the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway 
(Kredittilsynet) and one from the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and 
Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økokrim), one representative from the 
financial sector; the Norwegian Financial Services Association (FNH), and the Norwegian 
FATF delegate. I also interviewed one former law enforcement official with the underlying 
objective of getting a perspective on money laundering that was not bound to the 
interviewee’s professional position. This is in accordance with Hammersley and Atkinson, 
who claims that it is sometimes more effective to talk to people who has “left office”, since 
they can more freely offer inside information (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:138). 
     To get in touch with the interviewees, I attended a money laundering seminar where I 
came in contact with people who served as gate openers by recommending persons it would 
be useful for me to talk to. As such, I found the process of selecting relevant interviewees 
quite painless. I conducted semi-structured interviews of one hour endurance. It must be 
stressed that the analysis of the contents of the interviews are based on my interpretation of 
the interviewees’ accounts, and that accordingly, it can not be guaranteed that there are no 
incongruities between the interviewees’ opinions and my analysis. Thus, the persons whom I 
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talked to can not be held responsible for the arguments presented in this thesis. Due to the 
different professional positions of the interviewees, it was also reasonable to emphasize 
different topics depending on whom I talked to. The interviews were recorded, something that 
allowed me to concentrate on the accounts given by the informants, to support a natural 
course of the conversation. Although the interviews were fairly non-directive, they were 
structured in the sense that I entered them with a list of key topics to be covered, even if these 
did not follow a structured order. The interviews were transcribed immediately after each 
interview. This was favorable in the sense that it allowed me to simultaneously write down 
interpretative notes while I still had a fresh memory of the conversations. A summary was 
then made to each interview and coinciding perspectives are emphasized in the analysis. 
1.6 Thesis Structure  
The next chapter presents a review of the analytical tools used in the analysis. Three regime 
theory approaches are presented, which offer different but complimentary explanations to 
why states cooperate, how international regimes emerge and how cooperation within regimes 
is maintained. The chapter also introduces a technological systems approach and argues that 
the technical features of an issue area can shape international AML. Expected findings are 
listed at the end of the chapter. 
     Chapter three starts with a description of money laundering, what it is, its origins, the 
stages of it and common techniques. It is seen in light of globalisation and financial 
liberalization and the extensiveness of financial havens, which is considered crucial to 
understanding its dissemination. The chapter also describes the social embedding of 
technologies by drawing on perspectives from the STS school of thought. In this respect, the 
major bodies behind international AML are introduced. The features of the policy frameworks 
presented by these bodies reveal a dual role of ICTs in the sense that the same technologies 
vulnerable to exploitation by criminals can be used to target money laundering. 
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     Chapter four determines if international AML can be labelled an international regime. It 
further investigates if international AML possesses the features of a technological system, and 
the degree to which the technical features of money laundering countermeasures have an 
impact on AML policies. An explanation will be provided to the reasons why coordinated 
action has been initiated against money laundering. Empirical data is linked with the 
theoretical approaches, and it will be demonstrated that the various theories are relevant at 
different stages of AML. The findings are finally drawn up in chapter five. 
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2 Collaboration: International Regimes                       
versus Technological Systems 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the analytical tools necessary for me to be able to answer 
the following: Does there exist an international regime to combat money laundering? If it 
does, then how can its emergence be explained? If it does, are the features of this regime 
identifiable with a technological system? In that case, how does this affect AML policies? 
     An important feature of globalisation has been the creation of regimes to govern 
international relations, although theorists hold divergent views as to how and why regimes are 
created and maintained. Whereas people who hold a pessimistic view of globalisation doubt 
that it is possible to manage globalisation, regime theorists are optimistic and agree that the 
ability to benefit rather than suffer from it, depends on the “capacity to regulate global activity 
by means of regimes”(Little 2001:305). Regimes persist inter alia in areas of international 
security, in the regulation of environmental issues and of the international economy. Interest 
in studies of the regulation of state behaviour has subsisted since the emergence of the state 
system, but the regime concept is of relatively recent origin and was introduced by social 
scientists in the 1970s. 
2.1 Defining an International Regime 
The regime concept has been debated among theorists, but the most widely used definition is 
that of Krasner (1983:2) who identifies regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations”. By studying the four regime components separately it is 
possible to dismantle this definition. Principles are general formulations of objectives and 
basic casual understandings represented by bodies of theoretical statements about how the 
world works. Norms describe rights and duties of states and specify general standards for 
behaviour, whereas rules are specific directions for behaviour at a lower level of generality 
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than the two former components, often designed to conciliate existing conflicts between 
principles and norms. Together, principles, norms and rules constitute the substantial part of a 
regime. Many regimes additionally hold a fourth operational component; procedures, which 
identify agreed practices to ensure rule establishment and implementation. These will change 
when the regime is consolidated and extended (Stokke & Claes 2001). 
     Hasenclever et al. point out a number of implications of Krasner’s definition. Arguing that 
“Regimes are a special case of international institutions and should be studied as such” 
(Hasenclever et al. 1996:179), they stress that international regimes must be treated separately 
from international organizations, which are formal physical unit characterized by its mandate, 
localization and staff, often forming the central operational element in multilateral regimes. 
Further, regimes must be separated from negotiations, which are limited by case and lack a 
substantial core of recognized rights, duties and norms. Finally they must be separated from 
conventions; sharing with regimes the assumption that actors’ expectations centre on specific 
norms, but members of regimes do not always wish to carry out the norms if there are others 
who do (Stokke & Claes 2001:271). Other implications that are more controversial concern 
the meaning and distinction of the four regime components, as well as the phrase “around 
which actors’ expectations converge”, where the problem is to know when a regime actually 
exists in an issue area (Hasenclever et al. 1996:179). Despite these implications, Krasner’s 
definition will be the one referred to henceforward and if it is applicable in practice in the 
AML context, the regime components should be identifiable within international efforts to 
target money laundering.  
     The relevance of international regimes relies to a large extent on their effectiveness. If the 
regime does not contribute to solve the problem that motivated regime formation in the first 
place, its relevance will be questioned. Hveem (2001) refers to a number of regime features 
that are regarded important in this respect. First, regimes must be built on voluntariness as far 
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as attendance is concerned, but must simultaneously hold the possibility to perform some kind 
of sanctioning towards members who do not play by the rules, thus a balance between 
compulsion and voluntariness must be maintained. Moreover, rules and laws are not sufficient 
to secure successful cooperation, and there must be elements of learning and maybe also self- 
interest (Hveem 2001:105). International AML does however challenge the emphasis on 
voluntariness because the FATF seeks to enforce compliance in both member and non-
member countries, exemplified by the black-listing of non-cooperative actors. 
2.2 Three Schools of Regime Theory 
In the following, theoretical explanations will be given to why and under what conditions 
states agree to cooperate by developing institutions which might affect their alternatives of 
action. It is common to distinguish between three main approaches to regime theory. The first, 
power based theories, are rationalistic and emphasize the distribution of power between states. 
The second approach, interest based theories, is also a rationalist approach trying to reveal 
how international regimes can make it easier for states to realize common interests. Third, 
knowledge based theories regard international regimes as socially constructed phenomena and 
place discourse, ideas and learning at the centre (Stokke & Claes 2001:273).  
2.2.1 Power Based Theories 
Power based theories emphasize the distribution of power between states. A central aspect of 
this approach is the hypothesis of hegemonic stability. It refers to the presence of a hegemon; 
a strong, dominating actor in international politics which is important in order to realize 
collectively wanted outcomes. A hegemon possesses power resources. These resources serve 
as a pretext to make other countries adhere to the will of the hegemon by complying with 
commitments in international regulations (Stokke & Claes 2001:277). In order to make other 
countries comply, the hegemon can choose between persuasive means like inducements and 
promises, and coercive means like sanctioning or threats of sanctioning (Hveem 2001:111). 
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According to the hegemonic stability hypothesis, when the regime ceases to maintain the 
interests of this main actor, it is likely to collapse. The hegemonic stability thesis has however 
been criticized for not holding satisfactory evidence and tends to ignore other analysis than 
extreme power constellations (Stokke & Claes 2001). Moreover, the presence of a dominating 
actor is neither necessary nor enough in the establishment of an international regime 
(Hasenclever et al.1996:198).  
     According to Little (2001:301) the impact of regimes on international relations is that it 
will “facilitate co-ordination of policies and actions but only insofar as this does not alter the 
balance of power among states”. Coordination is here defined as “a form of cooperation 
requiring parties to pursue a common strategy in order to avoid the mutually undesirable 
outcome arising from the pursuit of divergent strategies” (314). Cooperation is thus a conflict 
of distribution of who gets what and according to Krasner this conflict can be solved by the 
use of power in three ways (Hasenclever et al.1996:200): (1) to determine who is allowed to 
play the game: less powerful actors are often not invited to join the game, (2) to dictate the 
rules of the game: the most powerful actor gets to dictate the outcome, and (3) to manipulate 
the outcome of regime formation: the most powerful player can manipulate others’ 
preferences with threats or promises.    
     Following the above account, when analyzing international money laundering 
countermeasures, it can be expected that the power based approach will manifest itself in 
relation to the initiating stages of AML cooperation. It should further be possible to identify a 
dominating actor encouraging regime establishment. It is commonly acknowledged that the 
USA is a hegemonic actor in many respects. An example of a US power resource is that they 
have the biggest financial market in the world. This US share of the world’s financial markets 
should indicate that the extensiveness of money laundering affecting the USA is 
correspondingly large. An incentive is thus created for using its powerful position to push 
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through international collaboration against the problem. If countries depending on business 
with the USA are denied access to their markets the consequences would be severe, thus it 
would be likely that international agreements would be adopted. Moreover, due to the 
influence of the USA in initiating the fight against money laundering, as exemplified by the 
establishment of the Vienna Convention and the Basle Committee Statement of Principles in 
1988, the hypothesis of hegemonic stability can be expected fortified in the AML context. In 
consistence with Krasner’s three ways in which states can use their power, the dictating of 
regime outcome through threats and promises should be ascribed to the USA. However, the 
hegemonic power in international AML does not immediately point to any particular country, 
rather it calls for the position of the FATF due its role as a standardizing AML body. Yet as a 
forum put together by the countries of the G7 it is likely that the power of the FATF reflects 
the will of the most powerful countries within this ensemble. Following the above indication 
it can be expected that the work of the FATF largely reflects US desires. 
2.2.2 Interest Based Theories 
Interest based and power based theories are both rationalistic and treat states as the most 
important actors in international relations (Little 2001:301). However their assessments of 
regime analysis are competing. As US hegemony was on the decline on the international 
scene in the late 1970s9, explanations of regime persistence had to be sought elsewhere than 
by the hypothesis of hegemonic stability. With his book  After Hegemony (1984), Keohane, a 
leading contributor to the interest based tradition, asks if international regimes can persist in 
the absence of a hegemonic power. He concludes that they can because international regimes 
are created because they are expected to ease cooperation, and that common interests are best 
realized through mutually adjusted behaviour in order for all actors to benefit from it (Stokke 
& Claes 2001:274). Keohane emphasizes three functions a regime can maintain (Stokke & 
                                                
9
 partly in relation to the effects of the US dollar devaluation in 1971 and the US military intervention in 
Vietnam from 1965 to 1973. 
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Claes 2001). One is the establishment of patterns for mutual liability, referring to recognized 
rules for behaviour which will create mutual expectations about each other’s conduct even if 
these rules are not subject to law enforcement. Actors will accept the costs of regime 
establishment in return for the expected advantages. The likelihood of regime creation thus 
augments if the “potential mutually beneficial agreements in the issue-area is large” 
(Hasenclever et al. 1996:186). The second function is the distribution of information. 
Cooperation is easier when states share information about goals and interests. This reduces 
information costs and makes it easier to form a basis for agreements that otherwise might be 
hampered by the insecurity of other’s intentions (Stokke & Claes 2001:274). As noted by 
Hasenclever et al. (1996:186), if regimes secure availability of information about each others’ 
compliance through monitoring arrangements, “they reduce the fear of being cheated”. If they 
additionally have procedures for collecting information on compliance this may reduce the 
fear that others dodge the agreements entered into (Stokke & Claes 2001:275). Besides, 
actors’ awareness of the detection probability by breach of contract, and the probability that 
the actors will meet again in future negotiations, increases incentives for engaging seriously 
with the commitments (ibid). Cost reductions of negotiating international agreements is the 
third central function of regimes. Negotiating several agreements between several countries is 
more resource demanding in terms of time, communication, information sharing and decision 
making than negotiating a common framework (Hveem 2001:109). The regularity of meetings 
and the comprehensiveness of participation of regimes make it easier for actors to come 
together and reach consensus than it would have been to negotiate a set of bilateral 
agreements. The costs of negotiating a common framework and the complexity of this 
framework in turn contribute to regime persistence (Hasenclever et al. 1996:187).       
     Keohane developed his theory within a framework of the Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrating 
the need for a collaboration strategy to show how regimes can influence actors’ ability to 
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cooperate. Collaboration is here referred to as “a form of cooperation requiring parties not to 
defect from a mutually desirable strategy for an individually preferable strategy” (Little 
2001:314). The Prisoner’s Dilemma describes interaction between two actors having two 
possible strategies each; cooperative and competitive. The juxtaposition of preferences reveals 
that infringing agreements may be the best strategy to pursue regardless of what other actors 
do (Little 2001:308, Hasenclever et al. 1996:183). Because both actors expect the other to 
choose competitive strategies, states fail to pursue collaborative strategies and miss an optimal 
outcome (Stokke & Claes 2001, Little 2001), but international regimes can be an instrument 
to overcome this dilemma.   
     If the interest based approach is relevant to the analysis, it can be expected that fighting 
money laundering is considered a common interest. This should be rooted in a recognition 
that targeting money laundering is more beneficial through international collaboration than it 
is to counter the phenomenon individually. Because of the crucial role of the FATF in 
international AML, it can be expected that the task force can replace the missing hegemon in 
developing a possible regime. If this is the case, Keohane’s three regime functions, mutual 
liability through recognized rules for behaviour; mutual information sharing and regime 
maintenance owing to cost reductions through comprehensive cooperation, are likely to be 
upheld under direction of the FATF.  
2.2.3 Knowledge Based Theories 
Cooperation does not necessarily have to be understood in light of the self-interest of rational 
actors, but can also be understood in terms of knowledge. Knowledge based theories place 
discourse, ideas and learning at the centre and criticise rationalist theories for not taking into 
account that the countries and organizations involved in international relations consist of 
people with individual meanings. They are constructivist in the sense that they stress that 
regimes must be seen as social phenomena arising as a reflection of the identities and interests 
 21 
of states and groups which are in themselves forged through interaction (Little 2001:296, 
Stokke & Claes 2001:278). As not to black box the meaning of the term “learning”, it will 
here be understood as a “process through which collective behaviour is modified in light of 
new collective understanding” (Haas 1994: 41). This emphasis links this approach to central 
ideas of the STS school of thought.  
     Consensus must be reached about the issue area at stake before states can agree on how to 
deal with it. Such consensus may be achieved after a process of learning. This calls for the 
hypothesis of epistemic communities, which is the pillar of knowledge based theories. Due to 
politicians’ inability of assessing the outcomes of their decisions, they call for scientifically 
reliable information (Hasenclever et al.1996:206). Epistemic communities refer to “networks 
of knowledge-based communities with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within their domain of expertise” (Haas 1994:45). This knowledge does not appear in 
isolation, but is “created and spread via transnational networks of specialists” (44). These 
experts can be politicians, diplomats, entrepreneurs and scientists, and they are crucial 
because if ideas and knowledge are to have an impact they must be commonly shared 
(Hasenclever et al.1996:209). The point is that these experts share a common understanding 
of the causes and characteristics of the problem at stake and agree on how the problem is best 
solved. Consensually shared knowledge is however not always guaranteed in international 
cooperation. In such situations compliance can be ensured by a hegemon in the issue area 
(216). According to Haas, epistemic communities influence regime creation and maintenance 
because negotiations succeeding policy innovations are conditioned by the information 
provided by the epistemic community. They also influence policy diffusion. Advances in 
modern communications and increased access to information allow epistemic communities to 
operate transnationally, and this international expert share of information can in turn affect 
their respective governments (209). 
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     If there exists an international AML regime, is it possible to identify a network of experts 
providing scientifically reliable information relevant to regime policies? If it is, it should be 
possible to identify an influence of such epistemic communities on regime formation and 
evolution. Moreover, evidence of epistemic communities should be found within the FATF 
and its surrounding network of international bodies engaged in combating money laundering. 
International AML standards including the FATF 40 Recommendations and other FATF 
documents should in this case be based on a certain degree of consensus knowledge before 
being presented as directions for behaviour.  
2.3 Technological Systems  
According to MacKenzie & Wajcman (1992:12) “technologies come not in the form of 
separate, isolated devices but as part of a whole, as part of a system”. A contemporary 
approach to such systems, the technological systems approach, has been developed by 
Hughes, demonstrating in his Network of Powers (1983) and The Evolution of Large 
Technological Systems (1993) how technologies are embodied in systematized knowledge 
with cultural, social, political and economic dimensions. At the heart of this approach lies a 
refusal to deal with the technological and the social separately (Bijker et al. 1993:196). This 
suggests that technological systems are socially constructed but also society shaping, which 
reveals close linkages to the knowledge based approach of regime theory. Hughes has 
identified specific system components including physical artefacts, organizations, 
scientifically labelled components as well as legislative artefacts, and uses the electricity 
power system as an example: Physical artefacts refer to turbo generators and transmission 
lines, organizations refer to firms and investment banks, scientific components can be articles 
and research programs and legislative artefacts refer to regulatory laws (Hughes 1993:51). By 
applying Hughes’ theory of technological systems on the regulation of the international 
financial system, Porter has modelled an approach demonstrating that where there exists a 
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technological system, it “can shape the conduct of actors involved in international institutions 
in ways that other approaches to international institutions, such as regime analysis, overlook” 
(Porter 2003:521). Referring to technological systems as “spatially extended and functionally 
integrated socio-technical networks” (522), his argument is that the technical feature of an 
issue area can influence international cooperation. This opposes a rationalist emphasis on the 
choice among alternatives, because according to the technological systems approach, in 
technology intensive issue areas these alternatives are shaped and constrained by technical 
factors associated with this system (524), but the technological system can also be used in 
reaching desired goals. Porter operates with three indicators of technological systems which 
may influence actors’ conduct. These are material embedding, complex path dependence and 
technical authority. Material embedding refers to how physical components of technologies 
by being applied are integrated with social dimensions, and this can produce patterns for 
regulated activity. Second, Porter claims that the need for coordination of the system 
components can stimulate established patterns for “institutional practices” (523). Once these 
patterns gain foothold this can secure regime maintenance, and is what Porter refers to as path 
dependence. In his words, the logic of technological systems is that  
Decentralized practical technical international arrangements precede, stimulate and 
shape high level political negotiations and these negotiations then seek to resolve 
problems from the prior technical collaboration through new institutional innovations. 
These new institutional innovations will build on the earlier technical arrangements 
(Porter 2003:527).   
 
Third, technical authority relates to the importance of scientific and technical expertise as a 
key source of generating authority, and refers to how compliance is based on the integrity of 
the source of rules rather than being based on self-interest and compulsion. This integrity is 
secured through the performance-based orientation of technical authority, which is also 
oriented towards practical relations that do not principally focus on politics. Moreover, 
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technical authority is open to criticism, revision and input from technical experts, and this 
may increase the legitimacy of this source of authority (523).  
     It is important to notify that Porter does not reject the role of traditional regime theory, but 
stresses that these approaches are modified in interaction with the technological systems 
approach in issue areas where such systems exist (540).   
     A potential weakness of Porter’s theory is that due to its resemblance to the already 
established regime theory, his contribution can in many respects call on the Emperor’s new 
clothes metaphor. Most of his accounts can be explained by either power, interest or 
knowledge based theories, thus it may be difficult to spot an obvious relevance to the analysis. 
However, if international AML can be identified as a technological system, Porter’s account 
contains aspects which probably can offer explanations that are more suitable for international 
AML than traditional regime theory. I hereby present a proposition saying that if international 
AML possesses the features of a technological system, it must first of all be possible to 
identify Hughes’ system components. These components may exists independently without 
there being a system, therefore, it will be argued that the presence of Porter’s concept of 
material embodiment is crucial as to link the system components together for there to be a 
technological system to speak of. The influence of a potential technological system on 
international AML will in turn be explained by Porter’s account of path dependence and 
technical authority. 
     The presence of technical features like the mentioned monitoring of financial transactions in 
order to detect suspicious activity based on technologies designed for this purpose not only 
suggests that international AML is a technology-intensive issue area but gives a hint of 
scientific components as well. Combined with the ensemble of bodies engaged in combating 
money laundering as well as AML rules that have been implemented in many countries, it 
should not be difficult to identify Hughes’ system components. Material embodiment should be 
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found in some kind of interaction between these system components, for instance a dependence 
on electronic networks. The relevance of this technical approach is particularly likely to 
manifest itself in explaining AML after September 11th 2001 and the onset of a risk based 
intelligence strategy based on preventive surveillance of financial transactions. This risk based 
approach can be seen as a product of the risk society; the idea that society is exposed to 
socially created risks, and is  “characterised by a cultural desire to tame chance and effect 
security, and by institutions increasingly organised around risk management” (Ericson & 
Doyle 2004:41 in de Goede 2004:3).  
     Path dependence can be linked to the interest based theory and Keohane’s assertion that 
once a regime is created it will persist due to the costs of creating it. Porter’s notion of path 
dependence seems to be rooted in what Hughes refers to as momentum and trajectory in his 
works. Because of an interrelatedness between physical and social system components, once 
consolidated technological systems gain momentum. For instance, companies, laboratories 
and regulatory bodies amplify the momentum of electric power systems, and inventors, 
scientists and politicians have vested interests in this systems’ persistence (Hughes 1993:77). 
At the early stages of application of new technologies, human actors like scientists and 
engineers can control its usage and progress. But as the system gets entangled in society over 
time its prevalence becomes predominant (76-80). This merging of technological determinism 
and “social determinism” that Hughes’ account insinuates can explain actors conduct at two 
levels. In prolongation of the feature of material embodiment, an expected dependence on 
electronic networks in combating money laundering could possibly be explained by the 
momentum these technologies have acquired in the financial system. Second, it can be 
expected that the momentum gained by international AML can explain regime persistence 
more specifically than Keohane’s account. In the analysis the term path dependence will be 
used instead of momentum. 
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     Technical authority has strong linkages to Haas’ epistemic communities concept. But a 
distinction between the two can be identified. Haas’ notion of scientific knowledge seems to 
be rooted not only in science, but includes political ideas and opinions as well. It takes into 
account the influence of social conventions, irrespective whether they have emerged out of 
scientific, cultural or political factors. Technical authority on the other hand, seems to be 
based more exclusively on scientific knowledge independent of prevailing ideological 
political ideas in the issue area at stake. This independence can provide breeding grounds for 
consensus knowledge in international cooperation. Its openness to criticism and revision 
suggests that technical authority may be perceived as a bottom-up expertise, whereas 
scientific knowledge of epistemic communities to a larger extent reflects top-down expert 
knowledge. If international AML has the features of a technological system, possibly Porter’s 
technical authority concept has more explanatory value than the notion of scientific 
knowledge related to epistemic communities. In this case it can be expected that AML 
standards are grounded in such “democratic” knowledge. 
2.4 Summary of Expected Findings 
Having presented the analytical tools for the analysis, the major tasks that are to be carried out 
can be summed up. First of all, can international AML be identified as an international 
regime? An answer to this will be provided by examining Krasner’s regime components: is it 
possible to identify specific principles, norms, rules and procedures through which 
international money laundering countermeasures are operationalized? The extensive 
framework of AML policies to be implemented in FATF member and non-member countries 
suggests that it is, and it can be expected that these regime components are recognizable 
within FATF provisions. The next task will be to examine what characterizes the international 
AML nexus. What kind of regime does international AML possibly represent? As 
demonstrated by Porter’s application of the technological systems approach, in issue areas 
 27 
where there exists a technological system, international cooperation can be conditioned by the 
technical features of the issue area at stake. Extensive use of payment technologies in money 
laundering schemes and a dependence on information gathered from these technologies in 
combating the problem indicates the technical characters of international AML. But does it 
also possess the features of a technological system? This assumption will be strengthened if 
empirical evidence shows that Hughes’ system components are present in the AML nexus, but 
only insofar as evidence of Porter’s material embodiment concept as a means of sticking these 
components together additionally is provided for. As indicated above it is likely that these 
requirements will be fulfilled. In particular, it can be expected that the feature of material 
embodiment is particularly obvious in explaining the risk based approach adopted after 
September 11th 2001.   
     The final task is to give an account of the driving forces behind international AML.  
In less than two decades an increasing number of countries have adapted to the regulatory 
framework provided by leading international AML bodies. What explains so many countries’ 
compliance with international AML standards? I will provide an answer to this by applying 
the three regime theory approaches and the technological systems approach on international 
AML. Although these approaches are divergent in many aspects, they must be treated as 
complementing rather than competing. All three possess value but none of them seem 
sufficient to explain regime formation and maintenance alone because they set different 
preconditions for how international cooperation should be understood. It will be demonstrated 
that elements from all approaches are useful in explaining the dynamics of international 
AML. The degree of relevance of the different approaches can be expected to vary depending 
on the different stages of the AML process. Viewed in the light of the presented theoretical 
perspectives, did international AML arise in response to a hegemonic actor using its power to 
promote collaboration? Taking into consideration the indicated role of the USA in 
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international AML, it can be expected that regime formation grew out of US interests. 
Keohane stressed that regimes also can persist in the absence of hegemonic actors if it is 
commonly recognized that collaboration in an issue area is more beneficial than it would be 
for countries to deal with this issue individually. Do countries jointly acknowledge the 
benefits of collaborating against money laundering? If such consensus is traceable it can be 
expected that the dictating of regime outcome consistent with Krasner, and the three regime 
functions consistent with Keohane, is maintained by the FATF. Following the knowledge 
based tradition, AML collaboration should reflect prevailing ideas, norms and knowledge 
commonly shared by a group of experts exemplary of epistemic communities. Is international 
AML characterized by such epistemic communities whose expert knowledge has influenced 
AML policies? Or is Porter’s concept of technical authority more prevalent in this respect 
than Haas’ hypothesis of epistemic communities? Or do the two concepts prevail at different 
stages of international AML? Is AML collaboration characterized by a choice of alternatives 
consistent with rationalist theories, or is it path dependent; is it subject to the momentum 
acquired through its own evolution? 
     The next chapter described how ICTs are used to facilitate and counter money laundering. 
It starts with an examination of money laundering techniques and typologies, and factors that 
are important to understand the dissemination of the phenomenon are briefly discussed. The 
last part of the chapter presents major bodies engaged in international AML. This account will 
serve as the starting point on which the analysis is built. 
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3 Facilitating and Fighting Money Laundering                                              
“Globalisation has turned the international financial system into a money launderer’s dream.” 
-Pino Arlacchi, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 1998.  
3.1 Origin and Typology 
Proceeds generated from illicit activity are of little use to criminals if the origins of the money 
do not avoid law enforcement suspicion. The money trail must thus be disguised. The term 
“money laundering” illustrates what happens: cleaning dirty money. It is the process through 
which illegally obtained funds is given the appearance of having originated from a legitimate 
source. The reason why criminals want to disguise these proceeds is twofold: first, because 
the money trail in itself can become evidence of the crime; and second, because the money is 
vulnerable to seizure and can become target of investigation (Blum et al. 1998:4).   
     Money laundering is not new. The origin of the term dates back to the 1930s when the 
mafia in the USA bought up cash based laundry halls with which illicit proceeds could be 
mixed to make it appear as legally obtained. Cross border money laundering goes back to 
the1960s and the outset of financial liberalization, when the opportunities to exploit the 
financial system increased. By opening bank accounts in financial havens, illegally earned 
income could be hidden in other countries (Helleiner 1999:4), thus opening up for an 
expansion of the activity. Today’s reach of money laundering must be treated as a global 
phenomenon. In a flash, large sums can be repeatedly relocated between bank accounts almost 
anywhere in the world via cross border transactions in a “borderless” financial network10. 
Such a view of state border elimination is however somewhat misleading, because money 
launderers can exploit land frontiers by seeking protection behind them as well as create new 
market opportunities (Williams & Baudin-O’Hayon:129).  
                                                
10
 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/money_laundering.html  
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3.1.1 Traditional Money Laundering 
The mode of money laundering can be described as a dynamic three stage process including 
placement, layering and integration. The placement stage is the initial entry of the funds into 
the financial system moving it away from direct association with the crime involved. This can 
be accomplished by depositing the money in domestic financial institutions. If the country of 
crime commitment is subject to strict financial regulation, an alternative is smuggling the 
money abroad and deposit it in less regulated jurisdictions. Another layering technique is 
buying up high value goods, like artworks, noble metal and antiques which can be resold by 
cheque or bank transfer payment (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, 1998). 
The placement stage is when launderers are most vulnerable because regularly dealing with 
large sums of cash increases the risks of raising suspicion. To reduce this vulnerability dirty 
money can be legitimized through fictive loaning bills from unknown shell companies, or 
brass plate companies, which are fictive companies having no assets or operations of its own 
but are used by their owner to conduct business dealings11. The second and most complex step 
of the process is the layering stage which takes place through a series of transactions designed 
to hide the origins of the funds. This is where the global dimension of money laundering 
appears. Funds are sent electronically from one country to another, and are subsequently spilt 
up into investments in advanced financial options or in overseas markets, being constantly 
relocated to evade detection. The money trail can also wriggle along between shell 
companies. At this stage faith is put in weak legislation and delays in juridical or police 
cooperation. As the money goes deeper into the international financial system it gets more 
difficult to identify its origins. Finally, at the integration stage a perception of legitimacy is 
created for the money to make it available to the criminal again. For smaller amounts this may 
be achieved by making withdrawals on secure credit cards issued by banks in financial 
havens. For bigger amounts it can be obtained by creating forged capital gains, for instance by 
                                                
11
 http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861733097/shell_company.html  
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establishing commercial businesses structured in a way where a shell company takes the loss 
and a home company benefits (Blum et al.1998:19). Figure 1 illustrates the three laundering 
stages. 
 
 
Figure 1-The laundry cycle        
 Source: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money_laundering_cycle.html  
Not all money laundering typologies are this sophisticated. The simplest form is buying up 
race horse betting slips at racetracks, a technique combining all three stages in one operation. 
The real winner is paid above the original winnings in return for a legitimate receipt for the 
illegally obtained funds; however, this is not a reasonable technique to pursue when dealing 
with large sums on a regular basis. In these situations launderers may establish legal cash 
based businesses like retail shops and restaurants, where legal and illegal money is mixed, 
making the business appear more successful than it is (Blum et al.1998:13, Gilmore 1999:36).  
3.1.2 Modern Laundering Trends 
Stricter regulation of financial institutions during the last decades has conjured money 
launderers’ dependence on bribing banking officials to avoid law enforcement suspicion. But 
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increased focus on the risks involved if getting entangled in laundering scandals has forced 
criminals to seek other techniques, and today’s financial system offers a wide range of 
instruments available. The financial infrastructure can be said to have evolved into a global 
system of money in the form of digital symbols on computer screens, referred to as 
“megabyte money” (Williams & Baudin O’Hayon 2002:132). Financial innovations in ICTs 
offer the benefits of speed, distance, anonymity and minimal audit trail amid daily fund 
transfers (Gilmore 1999:33).  
     The financial system allows electronic value to be represented digitally by electronic 
patterns. This does in effect not represent something new since it has been used by financial 
institutions for a long time. But technological advances including rapid networked 
communications with low costs per transaction, improved computer technology and mass 
production of chip cards and powerful public domain cryptography, have triggered 
widespread use of electronic cash (the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, 
1998). This can be transferred over the internet or through smart cards. The internet, “a 
‘network of networks’ linking regional networks through a common communications protocol 
or language” (Molander et al. 1998b:7) constitutes the core of electronic commerce. Limited 
to academic and military research from its introduction in 1969, in the 1990s internet usage 
started spreading at accelerating speed and became an omnipresent interactive source of 
communication in the global marketplace (Dicken 1998, Molander et al.1998b). A smart card 
is embedded with a microprocessor and/or a memory chip. The microprocessor card can add, 
delete, and otherwise manipulate information on the card, while a memory chip card (for 
example pre-paid phone cards) only can undertake predefined operations. A myriad of smart 
card categories are developed to enhance financial services, and are evolving rapidly into new 
market applications. Smart cards, also labelled stored value cards, contain money and have a 
built in cryptography which secures digital identity. They are different from magnetic stripe 
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cards in the sense that they offer greater memory storage as well as data security and 
processing. All functions and information are carried on the card; therefore they do not 
require access to intermediaries in the conduct of transactions12.  
     The introduction of these payment technologies affects the lives of ordinary people by 
providing them with the benefits of reduced transaction costs and increased efficiency of 
payment methods (Molander et al 1998b:1). Known under a collective term as 
cyberpayments, the common denominator of these technologies is that they support electronic 
transfer of value (Molander et al. 1998a:1). The reverse of the medal however, is the 
vulnerability of these payment methods to exploitation by money launderers. As stated by 
Molander et al. (1998a:16), “Cyberpayment systems have the potential to eliminate the money 
launderer’s biggest problem, the physical movement of large amounts of cash”. Moreover, 
Blum et al.(1998:28) argue that electronic payment systems in many ways represents a 
launderer’s dream since they offer the opportunity to imitate the patterns of legitimate 
transactions. Designed to imitate paper money in the sense that it passes immediately between 
two transacting on-line parties, is independent of intermediaries and leaves no audit trail, 
cyberpayments leave financial and law enforcement officials with obstacles to detection 
because the principle of knowing-your-customer is depreciated. This “disintermediation” in 
turn allows money launderers to avoid traditional law enforcement methods because 
anonymity is secured. Anonymity in combination with the speed of wire transfers and a wide 
variety of cyberpayment service providers moreover allows launderers to avoid credit card 
denomination limits and expiry dates, by holding multiple credit cards, multiple card holders 
and employing multiple card issuers. These payment technologies enable criminals to exploit 
national differences concerning security standards and rules regulating illicit financial activity 
                                                
12http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/framed.htm?parent=question332.htm&url=http://www.faqs.org/faqs/tech
nology/smartcards/faq/index.html  
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(Molander et al. 1998a:16), and conceal the movement of illicit proceeds. Figure 2 illustrates 
how money laundering can take place by the use of smart cards and communication 
technologies. 
 
Figure 2 -A hypothetical example of potential cyberpayments abuse.    
 Source: Molander et al. 1998b:19. 
By applying this example on the initial stage of money laundering, placement can be achieved 
by using a smart card or a personal computer (PC) to deposit money into an unregulated 
financial institution. Drug money can be invested in smart cards that are denominated in a 
certain value equivalent to the price of the drugs. The cards are then brought to a retail store 
where a merchant, who in return for a standard fee, uploads the electronic value on the card to 
an account in a financial institution. Once this stage is accomplished, layering and integration 
can be normally conducted in ways referred to in section 3.1.1. Layering and integration can 
also be conducted without the involvement of an intermediary financial institution through a 
PC instantaneously sending the funds through different layers over a network emancipated 
from national borders (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness  Canada, 1998), for 
instance as payment for internet services. At costs limited to web area rental large amounts of 
money can be laundered by establishing payment services like internet gambling or porn sites. 
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Sales are provided for by using the service and paying for it with smart cards that are 
connected to an unregulated financial institution account. As the launderer is the wirepuller of 
the business, the money is given the appearance of legal profit from the internet service. 
Internet payment services establishment does not require identification of the persons 
initiating it, allowing the establisher to use false identity or anonymous internet connection13. 
Internet banking and payment services thus make computers and smart cards a tool for 
transfer of dirty money, and it is difficult to control this network. Cyberpayments may 
therefore be labeled new laundering havens, in which private persons, firms, banks and other 
regulated and unregulated financial institutions depending on the network become part of the 
game, as victims or actors, intended or unintended.  
3.2 A Complex Phenomenon 
The factors underlying money laundering expansion must be understood in elucidation of 
complex and interrelated causalities and constitute too many aspects for there to be room for it 
in this thesis. Blum et al. have identified features of the international financial system 
complicating the “finding, freezing and forfeiting” of criminally derived funds. These include 
the “dollarization” of the black markets denominating an extensive use of US dollars in 
criminal business reducing transaction costs, a general trend towards financial deregulation, 
and a heavy proliferation of financial havens (Blum et al. 1998:22). The globalisation of 
modern communications and technical developments in banking and payment arrangements is 
claimed to have emerged in the absence of corresponding globalisation of legal frameworks, 
consequently offering an easy entry point of illicit assets into the financial system (Eide 
1994:108, Solongo 2001:1). This view is shared by Joly who points to the development of a 
global financial system superior to national laws (Joly 2002:174), and that unintentionally, 
liberalization of the markets has triggered the emergence of parallel criminal networks (175). 
                                                
13
 http://program.forskningsradet.no/oekrim/bakgrunn.html  
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     Although a complex phenomenon, a set of key factors frequently referred to as facilitators 
of money laundering are financial liberalization, financial havens and advances in Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs). To understand the spread of money laundering, 
these factors must be seen as interrelated.  
3.2.1 Globalisation and Financial Liberalization 
It is often expressed that globalisation has caused change for the worse. This has also been the 
case in relation to the impacts of financial crimes upon society, which is an oversimplification 
of reality. As does the statement of Mr. Pino Arlacchi at the introduction of this chapter, such 
views point in the direction of determinism. The globalisation concept, of which perceptions 
range from extreme hyperglobalist views referring to a new era and an autonomous global 
market, to a moderate interpretation claiming that globalisation does in fact not represent 
much new (Held et al.1999: 3-7), is complex. It is however commonly accepted that the 
world’s financial markets are radically changed, as can be illustrated by the speed and scope 
of money in circulation, and a position in between these contrasting perceptions of 
globalisation is the transformation perspective. Acknowledging great change in many areas, 
this notion of globalisation, which is the context in which money laundering is understood 
here, maintains that nor is globalisation an irreversible process, nor can it be understood 
neglecting the importance of social factors influencing these processes (7).  
     Despite the somewhat hyperglobalist insinuation of Mr. Arlacchi’s statement, a certain 
degree of truth lies in it. Two policy decisions were made by advanced industrialized 
countries in the 1950s that were important to the globalisation process; granting more freedom 
to market operators through liberalization initiatives and refraining from imposing effective 
controls on capital movements (Helleiner 1994:8). As such, financial liberalization has 
supported easy cross-border capital flow expansion which in turn has allowed for a 
flourishing of illicit transactions, thus money has been given new mobility increasing the 
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opportunities for money launderers to benefit from illegally gained funds (1999:2). Although 
not entirely global in terms of inclusion, financial liberalization is characterized by a growth 
in multinational banking, international money markets and cross-border listing of firms in 
several stock markets (Narula 2003:19). The speed of advances in financial ICTs allows for 
money to be relocated between fictive firms, banks and bank accounts in the time it takes to 
press a few computer keys. As a result the current international financial system faces 
difficulties in dealing with “the relatively chaotic financial consequences of global financial 
markets” (20). Blum et al. (1998:3) claim that “fuelled by advances in technology and 
communications, the financial infrastructure has developed into a perpetually operating global 
system in which megabyte money…can move anywhere in the world with speed and ease”. 
3.2.2 Financial Havens – from Juridical Loopholes to Financial Black 
Holes 
Proliferation of financial havens is identified as an important contributor and a necessary 
complement to the facilitation of money laundering (Blum et al. 1998:3). While AML 
professionals seek to promote transparency by enacting laws prohibiting financial secrecy, 
financial havens hamper this goal. Blum et al. explain why: 
Once the corporation is set up in the offshore jurisdiction, a bank deposit is then made 
in the haven country in the name of that offshore company, particularly one whose 
owner’s identity is protected by corporate secrecy laws. Thus, between the law 
enforcement authorities and the launderer, there is one level of bank secrecy, one level 
of corporate secrecy and possibly the additional protection of client-attorney privilege 
if a lawyer in the corporate secrecy haven has been designated to establish and run the 
company (Blum et al. 1998:17). 
This prevents governments from tracing dirty money. The investigation process in financial 
abuses is complex, requiring thoroughfares of numerous bank transactions, but gets 
additionally complicated when the money trail leaves domestic territory and relies on the 
willingness of foreign countries and territories to share information. The extensiveness of 
jurisdictions with underregulated banking systems in combination with strict secrecy policies 
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of financial havens is therefore likely to put and end to inquiry. The term “financial haven” is 
used deliberately as opposed to tax havens, which is too narrow, describing political strategies 
presented by politically autonomous units aiming at attracting foreign capital (Haslerud 
2003:20), and offshore financial centres (OFC), which is an imprecise term referring to 
various phenomena including export processing zones, international banking facilities and 
flags of convenience (17). Financial havens comprise countries, states, colonies, cities and 
geographical zones where finance centres offer tax regulations that are either lax or absent 
and a policy of more or less strict secrecy. The crucial point is that financial havens operate 
with secrecy strategies hiding customer identity and are partly reluctant to cooperate in terms 
of international information sharing (Tranøy 2003:8). This leads to a lack of transparency 
owing to insufficient reporting requirements and a lack of transaction supervision, due to both 
a willingness to cooperate and resources available.  
     Financial havens were originally used by wealthy people exploiting tax loopholes in 
national legislation. The activity was insignificant and the number of havens, including the 
British Isles, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Lichtenstein, was limited (Haslerud 2003:55). 
Today, the number of financial havens has expanded to all continents and their growth in 
firms, banks and other financial institutions is often outnumbering the local population. By 
offering tools designed to attract foreign business financial havens can be seen as political 
parasites seeking to “achieve self-enrichment in ways that are detrimental to global welfare” 
(Tranøy 2003:4). As such, these havens can be characterized as sanctuaries for the tax payers 
of other countries, undermining these countries’ sovereignty by giving shelter to those having 
something to hide from their national authorities (ibid). 
3.2.3 The Dual Role and Social Embedding of ICTs  
It is hardly necessary to call attention to the position of ICTs in our everyday-life, and the 
financial sector is only one field in which society has come to rely on these technologies. 
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Questions sought answered by STS scholars are how social and technological factors interact, 
and a central approach within the STS studies is the SCOT theory offering an explanation of 
this relationship. It stresses how people are involved in the creation as well as application of 
new technology, which is in fact not new but modifications of existing technologies (Wyatt 
1998:18), and refers to physical objects as well as human activities and people’s know-how to 
design and use it (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1992:3). According to Wyatt (1998) one of the 
features of technologies forming a legitimate basis for seeing them as socially constructed is 
that they represent the material embodiment of values and interests of a social group. The 
internet is a good example. Originally designed for military purposes, users saw opportunities 
for extended utility areas and improvements were designed based on these users’ needs. 
Likewise, electronic payment technologies were designed to reduce transaction costs and 
increase user-friendliness, but turned out to be vulnerable to exploitation by criminals. In turn, 
social needs represented by a desire to fight money laundering have formed the basis for 
pushing through technical countermeasures based on financial sector technologies. According 
to Porter (2003:537) the global financial infrastructure has evolved into a complex system of 
technical linkages, including electronic links between exchanges, electronic transfer systems, 
information networks, clearing houses and internet connections. This system can be used both 
for the purpose of conducting and countering money laundering. The rationale behind arguing 
that ICTs facilitate money laundering is that money can be moved anywhere in no time and at 
the same time evade law enforcement. Therefore modern ICTs represented by electronic 
payment systems have accelerated the laundering process. Simultaneously however, at the 
same time as these technologies offer both arena and hiding place for money laundering 
operations, they can be used to curtail the problem. When treated as a source of information 
gathering by law enforcement and payment system regulators, the technologies underlying 
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electronic payment systems constitute an indispensable tool for fighting money laundering 
(Molander et al.1998a:11). This is exactly what has been the case in international AML. 
3.3 Major Movers of Money Laundering Countermeasures 
Targeting money laundering has entered the agenda of several international organizations and 
is incorporated within the legal frameworks of an increasing number of countries, which bears 
witness to the high priority given to breaking the money laundering chain. There are still areas 
of the world that are not regulated, but it can be argued that the fight against the phenomenon 
is starting to reach global expansion. In the following, focus is directed at important 
achievements of major international bodies combating the phenomenon. Considering its status 
as a standardizing AML body, the role of the FATF is emphasized. Under its guidance, AML 
developments have followed a two-track approach grounded in the 1988 Vienna Convention 
concerning strengthening of the criminal law and the Basle Committee Statement of 
Principles regarding the preventing role of the financial system (Castle & Broomhall 1998:6). 
The FATF has outlined procedures to assist the implementation of international AML 
standards, and these procedures are conducted by using electronic payment systems as a 
source of information. Based on “normal” financial transactions, suspicious activities possibly 
prior to terrorist financing are sought identified and transaction data is stored for possible 
subsequent investigation. This illustrates how ICTs, or more precisely technologies 
underlying payment systems, can be used to combat money laundering. 
3.3.1 Initiating Landmarks 
The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
adopted in Vienna in December 1988 represented the initializing stage of international money 
laundering countermeasures. Designated to combat the laundering of proceeds from drug 
trafficking, the signatories of the convention agreed to criminalize the act of money 
laundering and increase international cooperation, as well as to pass laws to facilitate tracing, 
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seizing and confiscation (Castle & Broomhall 1998:6-7). A crucial implication of the 
Convention was the imposed obligation to offer far-reaching mutual legal assistance by 
abandoning the traditional paragraph of banking secrecy (ibid). 
     To meet the problem of extensive use of financial institutions in money laundering 
schemes, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision issued its Statement of Principles on 
the prevention of criminal use of the banking system for the purpose of money laundering in 
December 1988 (Castle & Broomhall 1998:6). Housed by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), the Basle Committee consists of representatives from the central banks and 
supervisory authorities of the G10 group of industrialized countries. The Statement was 
drafted by United States representatives and seeks to encourage preventive regulation of the 
banking sector through adopting policies of customer identification, suspicious transaction 
avoidance and transaction record keeping. In conformity with the Vienna Convention the 
Statement requests cooperation with law enforcement authorities, although in accordance with 
national confidentiality regulations (8-9). 
3.3.2 The Financial Action Task Force 
The FATF is the international body in charge of protecting the global financial system against 
money laundering and terrorist financing. It is an independent intergovernmental body whose 
primary goal is to yield the political will necessary for bringing about national legislative and 
regulatory reform to detect and confiscate laundered proceeds and replace financial secrecy 
with transparency. The role of the FATF is threefold. It oversees the building of effective 
AML systems in its member countries, reviews laundering techniques and promotes 
expansion of international AML by encouraging implementation of money laundering 
countermeasures in non-member countries (Williams & Baudin-O’Hayon 2002:137). It has no 
defined constitution and no unlimited lifespan. It was set up by the G7 at the Paris Economic 
Summit in 1989 and has up to date been an ad hoc arrangement with a temporary lifespan 
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whose mandate has been prolonged on a four year basis (Gilmore 1999:80-82), until 2004 
when its mandate was expanded by eight years. There are currently 33 FATF member 
countries and jurisdictions14 and its secretariat is housed by the OECD. Presidency rotates on 
a one year basis and its working structure is built around multidisciplinary groups represented 
by national delegations. The decision-making process is based on consensus. During three 
annual plenary meetings policy directions and initiatives are discussed and decisions are made 
on the basis of papers prepared by the Secretariat or reports from delegations15. The normative 
core of the FATF is the 40 Recommendations, set out to encourage implementation of the 
contents of the Vienna Convention and the Basle Committee Principles16. They were first 
launched in 1990 and revised in 1996 and 2003 as to keep pace with laundering techniques 
and foresee future challenges17. The 2003 version also attacks terrorist financing as 
formulated by the Eight Special Recommendations18. Revisions are based on experiences of 
its member countries and on policies of other AML organizations but are open to non-
members, observers, financial sector institutions and other parties affected by money 
laundering (Castle & Broomhall: 1998:12). The 40 Recommendations represent an 
international AML standard designed for universal application (Tranøy 2002:13). They are 
not prescriptive, but set out principles for action for their implementation to be adjusted to the 
constitutional structure of each country. Today’s revised version, which has been endorsed by 
more than 130 countries and jurisdictions, covers a broad set of bank and non-bank financial 
institutions and professions vulnerable to money laundering, including exchange bureaus, 
commodity brokers, insurance companies and money transmission services (Gilmore 1999: 
                                                
14The FATF member countries and governments are: Argentina; Australia, Austria; Belgium; Brazil; Canada; 
Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Luxembourg; 
Mexico; the Kingdom of the Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; the Russian Federation; Singapore; 
South Africa; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; United Kingdom; and the United States. The European 
Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council are also members. (http://www.fatf-gafi.org).   
15
 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/AboutFATF_en.htm#Decision-Making  
16
 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/40Recs_en.htm.  
17
 All references to the 40 Recommendations are based on the revised 2003 version. 
18
 See http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/SRecTF_en.pdf for details. 
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34). To limit the risk of displacement to other sectors the area of application has further been 
expanded to accountants, lawyers, estate agents19 and any business accepting large cash 
amounts, like car dealers, auction houses, art galleries and jewellers. Briefly summarized the 
message of the 40 Recommendations is to: 
• Criminalize money laundering and enact laws to confiscate proceeds of crime 
• Maintain rules for customer identification and record-keeping in financial institutions, 
and pay special attention to new technologies favouring anonymity 
• Require reporting of suspicious transactions to authorities  
• Keep adequate systems for control and supervision of financial institutions 
• Make the preconditions necessary to contribute to effective international cooperation 
at all levels 
A closer explanation can be provided to some of the above points. Customer identification 
rules intend to prohibit anonymous customer relations. The purpose of record-keeping is to 
make transaction information available to authorities for backtracking in relation to 
investigations. A piece of information might not be relevant to law enforcement at the time of 
registration, but if prosecution attached to a person linked to the transaction is initiated later, 
this information can be crucial, thus transaction records are required to be kept for five years. 
The rationale behind paying attention to new technologies is that despite the admitted lack of 
evidence of cyberlaundering at the time of inclusion of this request (Recommendation 8), 
these technologies were seen as potential obstacles to effective AML (Gilmore 1999:93). 
Paying attention to suspicious transactions can be an awkward task due to troubles of 
determining what is meant by it. A common yardstick is the imposed limit to transactions 
above a certain amount (USD 10.000), but this has been evaded by money launderers through 
“smurfing”; the structuring of transactions right below reporting limits (31). What also 
                                                
19
 The EU was in fact the first body to introduce rules concerning the inclusion of lawyers and accountants in     
    relation to reporting requirements. This forms part of the second EU Directive. The FATF included these   
    professions later (Information retrieved from interview with an AML professional, June 2004)  
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renders this task difficult is a lack of proximity to visible money laundering victims. Affecting 
the community in general, a position of not-in-my-term-of-office is easily adopted. This leads 
to an open-handed follow-up of reporting requirements by banking officials, allowing 
criminals to seize a bigger share of societal goods, offering less to others (Eide 1994:109).  
    Implementation of the 40 Recommendations can be ensured through a set of mechanisms 
ranging from relatively modest persuasion to more coercive instruments. At the one extreme 
lies technical assistance provided by FATF experts from legal, financial and law enforcements 
fields to identify areas of improvement and backwardness and offer compliance guidelines to 
those seeking to meet AML standards. Apart from receiving advice in establishing legislation, 
governments have been encouraged to train financial sector personnel and set up Financial 
Intelligence Units (FIUs) to monitor transactions (Williams & Baudin-O’Hayon 2002:137). 
These FIUs analyse and process reports on transaction activity and arrange for rapid exchange 
of information between financial institutions and law enforcement authorities as to facilitate 
detection of money laundering. As part of the technical assistance strategy, a detailed 
methodology based on the 40 Recommendations and the 8 special Recommendations to 
evaluate AML and anti-terrorist financing efforts has been agreed upon in collaboration 
between the FATF, the IMF and the World Bank. Further, mechanisms of mutual evaluation 
and self-assessment exercises are conducted through which each member country provides 
status information by responding to a questionnaire. This information culminates in annual 
typologies exercises drawing on recent potential obstacles to effective AML, like wire 
transfers, cyberpayments, shell companies and shell individuals, politically exposed persons 
(PEPs), gate keepers20, terrorist financing, non-bank financial institutions and non-financial 
professions vulnerable to money laundering (Gilmore 1999:101). These mechanisms serve as 
                                                
20
 Politically exposed persons refer to “individuals who are or have been in the past entrusted with prominent 
public functions in a particular country” (FATF Typologies 2003-2004:19). Gatekeepers here refers to the 
involvement of various legal and financial experts from whom money launderers seek advice or services (FATF 
Typologies 2003-2004:24). 
 45 
peer group pressure in which responsibility is laid in the hands of the member countries for 
them to actively work towards compliance. Moreover, there are monitoring mechanisms to 
ensure that all participants have adequate supervisors with the power to secure compliance as 
well as authorities to review effectiveness of the actions taken. Finally, coercive means of 
sanctioning or threats of sanctioning can be found at the other extreme. For instance, in 2000 
the FATF compiled a list of non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCTs), a dynamic 
naming and shaming process based on the degree of compliance with the 40 
Recommendations. Fifteen jurisdictions were initially listed and these countries would remain 
listed until their policies were improved. As of July 2004 there were six NCCTs left21.  
     The putting into practice of the 40 Recommendations illustrates how the same technologies 
potentially exploitable to money laundering can be used as an instrument to curtail it; the 
requirements of suspicious activity reporting and record-keeping and the subsequent 
possibility of backtracking relevant information are based on transaction data. Cracking down 
financial haven secrecy has been among the top priorities of the FATF. Apart from the 
naming and shaming process, discussions have been initiated with the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)22 in order to prevent customer anonymity 
when dealing with customer transfers (Gilmore 1999:102). International community pressure 
has subsequently forced many financial havens to cooperate with foreign governments. 
     As part of an overall objective of spreading the AML message the FATF has encouraged 
creation of several regional style bodies to follow up on mutual evaluations and reviewing 
                                                
21
 The initial NCCTs were the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, 
Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines. The 6 remaining NCCTs are the Cook Islands, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nigeria and the 
Philippines. (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/NCCT_en.htm). 
22
 The SWIFT is a worldwide community through which financial institutions connect to one another, whose 
purpose is to be the leader in communications solutions enabling interoperability between its members, their 
market infrastructures and their end-user communities. http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item_id=41756  
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new laundering trends in their respective areas23. Increasingly, lager areas of the world are 
being covered by money laundering countermeasures, aiming at securing an impermeable 
AML network. In addition to these regional bodies, the FATF also cooperates with other 
international bodies and organizations. FATF principles have been implemented within the 
frameworks of the EU, the European Council and the UN inter alia, although these bodies also 
have developed independent AML policies. In particular, the UNODC launched an important 
AML research programme, the Global Programme against Money Laundering (GPML) in 
1998, which offers an extensive technical assistance programme24. 
3.3.3 Law Enforcement Engagement: the Egmont Group 
The problem arising when money trails leave domestic territory explains why enforcement 
authorities have endeavoured to establish mutual international information sharing. Interpol is 
the largest formal international police organization facilitating cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation (Gilmore 1999:69). It offers a global communication system based on wide-
reaching criminal databases and analytical services25; however, money laundering forms but 
part of its agenda. An international grouping that focuses specifically on money laundering is 
the Egmont Group, currently consisting of 94 countries. Opposed to Interpol, the Egmont 
Group has an informal mandate. Arising out of a Belgian/USA initiative, it came into being in 
1995 as a FIU network (72). Due to the inertia of countries’ traditional law enforcement 
systems, obligations on mutual information sharing was an underlying motive for the FATF to 
encourage creation of FIUs (Recommendation 13 and 14). Accordingly, the cornerstone of 
this grouping is the availability of financial information to national authorities stored on an 
encrypted web page. It permits members to “access information on FIUs, money laundering 
                                                
23
 These regional bodies comprise the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Caribbean Financial 
Action Task Force (CFATF), the Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures (MONEYVAL, former Council of Europe PC-R-EV), the Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group 
(ESAAMLG), and the forthcoming Middle East and Northern Africa regional body. 
24
 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money_laundering.html, http://www.imolin.org/imolin/gpml.html. 
25
 http://www.interpol.int/Public/Icpo/default.asp  
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trends, financial analytical tools, and technological developments” (Gilmore 1999:73). To 
obtain a joint international understanding of laundering techniques, the Egmont network 
practises modes on recent lines of action and uses the network to inquire about members 
countries’ experiences. The Egmont collaboration network thus represents something new 
regarding law enforcement working methods in trying to operate ahead of criminals rather 
than always lagging behind. It is a response to a modern crime picture requiring 
corresponding modes of countermeasures. 
3.3.4 Financial Sector Engagement: the Basle Committee and the 
Wolfsberg Group 
Millions of wire transactions a day leave law enforcement officials to rely on banks, insurers, 
exchange bureaus and other financial intermediaries to unveil illicit transaction activity. The 
recognition that financial institutions are being used in money laundering schemes has 
triggered financial sector engagement. Potential implications of getting involved in laundering 
scandals have encouraged a focus on public confidence and credibility maintenance, as to 
avoid negative publicity severely affecting the business. Adopting the contents of the 1988 
Basle Committee Principles can contribute to avoid such situations. Moreover, the 1997 Basle 
Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision encourages banking supervisors 
to make sure their banks have adequate preventive policies, which is ensured by building 
supervisory capabilities of central banks and other financial intermediaries26. 
     Pieth and Aiolfi (2003:2) claim that “in 1988 it was the banks themselves that requested 
the movers of the G7 countries and others to clamp down on illegal drug markets”. When 
AML instruments were imposed on the banking world in the 1990s however, many banking 
institutions were unprepared because customer identification and reporting requirements 
represented something new and controversial to many countries. It led to uneven 
implementation which in turn left banking institutions with perceptions of a tension between 
                                                
26
 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc102.pdf. 
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the costs of AML and the benefits of containing financial crimes, as well as the risk of losing 
customers to competitors offering weaker regulation. Thus an emerging “patchwork of rather 
diverse rules” cleared the way for money launderers to exploit these incongruities (Pieth and 
Aiolfi 2003:3). Harmonization of divergent AML regulations was needed and this initiative 
came from the banking sector itself. As an association of twelve global banks aiming to 
develop financial services AML and terrorist financing standards, the Wolfsberg Group came 
together in 2000 to draft private banking guidelines known as the Wolfsberg Anti-Money 
Laundering Principles for Private Banking27 (4). Like the Basle Principles, the Wolfsberg 
Principles seek to prevent use of the banking system for money laundering purposes. Because 
of its late arrival, it has been criticized for not representing anything new, in addition to being 
a voluntary code of conduct not likely to bring along significant results. However, as stressed 
by Pieth and Aiolfi the strength of the principles is found in the commitment of participating 
banks to ensure compliance in all their operations, including offshore centres. What makes the 
Wolfsberg Process special despite its criticism is that it represents an independent private 
sector contribution to fight money laundering and it is built on a risk based rather that a rule 
based government approach, which will be further discussed in the analysis. Accordingly, the 
Wolfsberg Principles specifically help banks determine the degree to which they should 
engage with AML requirements. 
3.3.5 Fresh arrivals: the IMF and the World Bank 
As revealed above, concerted action has been taken by many important international bodies 
and organizations to combat money laundering. Similar engagement from the IMF and the 
World Bank has been much awaited by the international community. The FATF naming and 
shaming strategy turned out to be efficient in terms of targeting non-compliant actors; 
however, in 2003 it was abandoned and replaced by a more consensual and inclusive audit of 
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 http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/  
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offshore jurisdictions under direction of the IMF (Sharman 2004:22). The IMF audits are only 
published by approved of each jurisdiction. Rather than receiving a distinction as compliant or 
not, the jurisdictions in question can make comments to the report (ibid). In the period 
between 2002 and 2003 the IMF and the World Bank conducted a twelve month pilot 
program assessment of international standards in both industrialized and developing countries, 
in cooperation with international colleagues. Since then, the IMF has received requests from 
more than 100 countries to help establish AML frameworks28. As from March 2004 the 
boards of the Bank and the Fund finally agreed to take on comprehensive action by 
conducting compliance assessments with international standards in their member countries 
and offering country-specific technical assistance to those in need of it. In cooperation with 
the FATF, the two institutions have arranged workshops for regional bodies and developed a 
methodology for assessing compliance with the 40 Recommendations29. The annexation of 
these bodies indicates an AML framework which is about to reach global expansion. 
3.3.6 Electronic AML 
An attempt to improve efficiency regarding money laundering detection is not far away. As 
the first country in the world, Norway has passed a law requiring all financial institutions to 
introduce electronic monitoring solutions by 2005. This puts responsibility in the hands of 
financial institutions. These solutions are built on USA models and include risk based 
scenario modelling of customer activity based on networked financial institution data which, 
by employing linkage analysis, enables the tracking of unusual patterns. It is crucial that this 
modelling is not predefined but based on covariance analysis in which input data changes 
over time. If a customer suddenly changes behaviour for instance, and uses a bank known for 
laundering money, the system posts an alert for the situation to be investigated. Top-tier 
brokerage firms such as the British Morgan Stanley and Unity Trust Bank, and Bank of 
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 Interview with an AML professional, June 2004. 
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 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2004/pr0470.htm  
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America have taken a lead in implementing and testing this technology, in which the goal is to 
risk-rank unusual transaction activity but also guarantee accuracy by minimizing false alarms. 
Electronic AML technology is not primarily set out to detect money laundering, but to help 
financial institutions comply with regulations. These solutions also safeguard financial 
institutions through knowing-your-employee. The system reveals who conducts transactions 
and stores patterns of employee activity, and can to some extent meet the problem of 
corruption. Expected outcomes of this process are significant increases in suspicious activity 
reports, and consequently increased exposure of money laundering cases. This can however 
only be achieved in so far as the working procedures within financial institutions are followed 
up in conformity with the technological solution. Especially important is the process of 
examining alerts to determine if there is reason for further investigation. In doing so, financial 
institution officials are authorized to abandon professional secrecy, therefore reporting must 
be reasonable. This reveals that combating money laundering does not solely depend on 
regulative and technical efforts, but on human resources, indicating that AML technologies 
are socially embedded. Electronic AML is still at its elementary stage and is not meant to 
replace manual reporting systems but to complement them by intercepting complex 
connections that are impossible to trace manually. 
     A Norwegian initiative meeting the problem arising when money leaves domestic territory 
is the Norwegian Currency Register, entering into force in 2005. As an improvement of 
previous constellations, it seeks to control funds flows in and out of the country and imposes 
duties for banking institutions to report all incoming and outgoing transactions including cash 
and credit card transfers above a certain amount. The register makes information directly 
accessible to law enforcement authorities.  
*** 
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     Having demonstrated how payment technologies can be used both to support and counter 
money laundering, and having presented major contributors to international AML, attention 
can now be directed at deciding if there exists an international regime in this issue area. The 
dependence on technologies in fighting the phenomenon gives a hint of linkages to a 
technological system. It can be asked if the technical features of international AML has any 
effect on AML policies. In the following chapter these questions will be addressed. It will also 
be explained why enhanced international action has been taken against the problem. 
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4 Explaining AML Emergence and Conduct 
4.1 Introduction 
Governmental interest in fighting money laundering has been an issue only since the late 
1980s, but during this period international AML has gained momentum. The fact that a group 
of states have succeeded in initiating and conducting extensive AML efforts contradicts a 
common assumption in international political economy about the loss of power of states 
following globalisation (Helleiner 1999:2). Quite contrarily the achievements of the 
international AML nexus are so thoroughly coordinated that it can be asked if there exists an 
international regime to regulate the issue area. Continuously working towards common goals, 
rules and practises for regulation, law and monitoring, objectives of criminalizing money 
laundering and simplifying international cooperation have been reached. Section 4.2 
demonstrates that international AM can be labelled an international regime. Section 4.3 
describes the characteristics of international AML and demonstrates that it possesses the 
features of a technological system. An explanation to growing international responses to 
money laundering is offered in section 4.4. The effectiveness of international AML will be 
briefly discussed at the end of this chapter. 
4.2 Identifying International AML as an International Regime 
The components of the definition of international regimes can be identified within 
international AML. The principles component, referring to general formulations of objectives 
and basic understandings about how the world works, can be linked to the aims of 
international AML, which are to promote policies to combat money laundering by removing 
the proceeds from criminals and subsequently also the motivation to continue the activity. 
Transparency constitutes the key principle on which all financial activities should be built. 
The norms component describing rights and duties of states and specifying general standards 
for behaviour can be formulated as the right of all countries to operate within a just financial 
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system. Achievement of this requires all countries to contribute to international cooperation 
through compliance with international AML standards. To secure the underlying principle of 
transparency, all financial secrecy provisions must be abandoned and relationships supporting 
the use of anonymous shell banks and companies must be denied. In return, every country 
making an effort to reach compliance is entitled to technical assistance provided by leading 
AML bodies that are obliged to safeguard the interests and opinions of all member countries. 
As specific directions for behaviour at a lower level of generality than the two former 
components, the rules component is identified through an extensive framework of specific 
measures to be implemented in participating countries. These include inter alia reporting 
requirements of suspicious activities, record keeping requirements, policies for securing 
customer identity, and requirements to establish FIUs. The identified principles, norms and 
rules constitute the substantial part of the regime. 
      
The operational part of regimes contains procedures identifying practices for implementing 
rules. In the context of an international AML regime, of which the contours by now should be 
settled, the mechanisms for ensuring implementation of the main principles of the 40  
Box 1. The regime components of the international AML regime 
 
The substantial part of the AML regime:   The operational part of the AML regime: 
 
Principles -Secure financial transparency  Procedures -Technical assistance 
-Remove profit from criminals    -Mutual evaluation 
         -Monitoring 
Norms  -Comply with international AML     -Personnel training 
 Standards      -Sanctioning or threats of 
  -Abandon secrecy provisions     sanctioning (i.e. restricted 
  -Deny anonymous customer relations    access to markets, limited 
  -Receive technical assistance from     support from financial 
AML bodies        institutions, black-listing  
         of NCCTs etc.) 
Rules  -Suspicious activity reporting   
  -Customer identification requirements 
  -Record keeping 
  -International information sharing 
  -Establish FIUs 
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Recommendations can be recognized as such procedures. Including technical assistance, 
mutual evaluations and monitoring, these procedures ensure the putting into practice of the 
rules to be implemented in member and non-member countries. In fact, by its mandate, 
localization and staff, the FATF itself constitutes the operational part of the regime. 
International AML clearly possesses features applicable for all components of the definition 
of an international regime. Having determined that there is an international AML regime, it 
must be investigated what sort of regime this is and which of and at what stages of the process 
the approaches to international regimes prevail.   
4.3 The Material and Social Embodiment of International AML 
It has been argued that in issue areas where there exists a technological system the technical 
features of this system can influence the way politics in that issue area operate. To support the 
assumption that international AML is a technology intensive issue area attention can be 
directed to its initial stages. The reasoning why enhanced action was initiated against money 
laundering is grounded in concerns with increased drug related money laundering and a 
subsequent abuse of financial system instruments in money laundering schemes. To attack 
this problem AML requirements based on financial transactions, like suspicious activity 
reporting and information processing, were implemented. This gives a hint of the technical 
characters of international AML, but is it also a technological system? The presence of system 
components shows that it is. Extensive use of the financial system infrastructure in the fight 
against money laundering, including information processing based on electronic payment 
systems reveals evidence of physical artefacts. This refers to the networked machines, 
hardware, software and optical fibres constituting these payment technologies. The number of 
bodies engaged in AML, the FATF, the UN, IMF, the World Bank, financial institutions and 
enforcement bodies inter alia leaves little doubt to the presence of organizations. The structure 
of many of these bodies also gives a hint of their technical structure. A quick glance at the 
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FATF web pages indicates that its structure is practically oriented around the demands of the 
task to be solved, which can be illustrated by the annual typologies exercises. A technical 
focus is also central to the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. It has no organizational 
chart or articles of agreement, but operates through informal subgroups and task forces based 
on consensus and processes of mutual education (Porter 2003:536). The Egmont network of 
FIUs is another example of technical informal cooperation. Modes on recent laundering 
techniques are practiced and the goal is to operate ahead of crime commitment. Scientific 
components can be exemplified by the FATF typologies and FIUs. Finally, legislative 
artefacts are identified in national legal policy frameworks. Examples include requirements of 
customer identification, suspicious activity reporting and record keeping procedures 
expressed by the USA Patriot Act. These system components can exist without there being a 
system, thus evidence of material embedding must be provided. Consistent with theory, this 
must be sought in the interaction between human and non-human actors. An example is the 
use of financial instruments in the implementation of rules and procedures, and this is 
particularly evident after the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 when international AML 
took on a more risk based approach. For instance, the so called dataveillance techniques; “the 
proactive surveillance of what effectively become suspect populations, using new 
technologies to identify risky groups” (de Goede 2004:7) illustrates this. It is a technique 
which relies on sophisticated computer technologies built on mathematic modelling and 
entails classification and analysis of financial transaction data which “relies on the prior 
construction of ‘normal financial transactions’” (ibid). These technologies allow for 
communication between the actors involved but are not optimal if not networked. A specific 
reference to such networked technologies is the SWIFT community through which financial 
institutions communicate.  
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     The adopted risk based intelligence strategy based on the searching for suspicious activity 
indicates a watershed in international AML. Before the terrorist attacks international AML 
used transaction technologies to trace drug related money after crime commitment. After the 
terrorist attacks focus was primarily directed at preventive electronic surveillance of financial 
activity in order to predict terrorist financing, in which all actors basically are rendered 
suspects (de Goede 2004). It can be questioned if the regime has changed from an AML to an 
anti-terrorist financing regime; however, that would be misleading because money laundering 
and terrorist financing represent different needs. Money laundering involves the cleaning of 
dirty money as to hide the funds’ origins and is profit motivated, and terrorist financing 
entails a “soiling” of clean money as to hide the destination of the funds and is ideologically 
motivated. The new regime reflects the threat to society which had changed to “clean money 
intended to kill, not illicit proceeds of crime looking for a place to hide” (de Goede 2004:3). 
Countermeasures consequently had to reflect this new threat as previous techniques appeared 
inefficient, which can be illustrated by the statement of a chairman of the US National 
Security Council Committee on Terrorist Financing after the terrorist attacks: “Last year the 
promise of decades of work was silenced by the assault on New York and Washington” (ibid). 
What separates the AML tracing strategy from the preventive anti-terrorist strategy is that the 
threshold for violating civil liberties has shifted towards an increased political will to overrule 
civil rights. International terrorism represented as a greater immediate threat than money 
laundering, thus the use of more controversial means of combating the problem could be 
legitimized. In turn, the Patriot Act offered incentives to design and use technologies that 
infringe the civil liberties.      
     The intension behind emphasizing the contribution of a technological system in the 
regulation of international AML is not to depreciate the role of power, interest and knowledge 
based theories. But the character of contemporary international AML must be viewed in light 
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of the interaction between physical and human dimensions on which it is built. The AML 
regime includes “a constellation of (inter)national policy bodies, intelligence agencies and 
private actors, and encompass techniques of training, reporting and regulating” (de Goede 
2004:24), and such technical arrangements can influence AML policy directions.  
4.4 Explaining AML formation and persistence 
This section explains why so many countries have complied with international AML 
standards. It will be demonstrated that the relevance of the various theoretical approaches 
presented in chapter two must be seen in relation to different stages of the regime process. 
Therefore they must be seen as complementing rather than competing. First, the contribution 
of the power based approach is seen in relation to the dominant position of the USA and the 
FATF. Second, it will be demonstrated that countries are starting to realize the benefits of 
collaborating against a common enemy, consistent with the interest based theory. Third, the 
role of expert knowledge in international AML is assessed, and the relevance of the technical 
authority concept will be opposed to scientific knowledge exemplary of epistemic 
communities. Finally, it will be demonstrated that international AML is path dependent in the 
sense that it is subject to the momentum acquired through its own evolution.  
4.4.1 State power: the Role of the USA  
It is commonly accepted that the USA in many respects is a hegemonic power. In the 
international AML context the USA used its power to initiate countermeasures. Evidence of 
this is found in the Vienna Convention and the Basle Committee Principles. Although the 
negotiating of these initial landmarks was conducted in cooperation with European actors, 
they largely set out to meet US concerns. According to the power based approach this 
hegemonic role of the USA would have to persist as for the regime to be maintained. Three 
incidents symbolize how other states yielded submission to the will of the USA. The first 
incident illustrates the significance of the US share of the world’s financial markets, and 
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supports the theoretical assumption regarding the ability to control power resources. In 
relation to a drug investigation in the early 1980s US governments requested access to 
financial information from branches in the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. As they refused, 
threats of seizure of their US assets made the branches give up the information, and mutual 
legal assistance treaties were signed between the parties to combat money laundering 
(Helleiner 1999:31). Since this took place before the initiating of the Vienna Convention it 
does not explain US hegemony in relation to international AML, but it is likely that the 
episode triggered a US will to promote international cooperation. Second, in the late 1990s 
President Clinton initiated a proposal to strengthen AML, but it was restrained by a republican 
dominated congress unwilling to go through with any change limiting the courses of action in 
the banking sector (Pieth & Aiolfi 2003: 272). However, the Clinton administration did 
succeed in promoting the top-down black-listing of NCCTs. A proposal was made to three 
multilateral bodies to name and shame countries that hade developed underregulated financial 
centres by 2000, and it was undertaken by the FATF, the OECD and the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF)30 simultaneously (Wechsler 1998:49). In the aftermath of this process the 
financial ministers of the G7 threatened to restrict financial transactions with listed 
jurisdictions, and limited support from international financial institutions would be considered 
if they did not undertake efforts to adopt AML policies (50). Consequently almost all listed 
countries adhered to the requirements. Third, when the Bush administration entered the scene 
in 2001 there were government officials who were sceptical to impose stricter regulations 
against money laundering and financial secrecy. But the terrorist attacks of September 11th 
2001 gave rise to a policy u-turn as linkages were discovered between money laundering and 
terrorist financing. Six weeks later the Patriot Act was passed. It formed a legal basis 
requiring financial institutions to establish policies to tackle money laundering and terrorist 
                                                
30
 The FSF was formed in the wake of the Asian financial crisis to “promote international financial stability 
through information exchange and international co-operation in financial supervision and surveillance” 
(http://www.fsforum.org/home/home.html). 
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financing which, at a minimum, must include internal procedures, policies and controls to 
guarantee for compliance officers, employee training and instituting program testing by 
independent auditors in all financial institutions. The mentioned dataveillance system is a 
product of the Patriot Act requirements. An example of such systems is the so-called 
MATRIX (Multistate Anti-TeRorism Information eXchange). It serves as a database in the 
search for irregularities and contains government files on all US residents based on personal 
data collected from the government and from private companies (de Goede 2004:8). Although 
with only domestic sphere of application, the Patriot Act directs the international community 
in general and led to expanded commissions of the FATF and enhanced international action 
against money laundering and terrorist financing. These three incidents symbolize that the 
USA used its hegemonic power to make other countries adhere to their will and promote 
AML development and compliance, and is in accordance with one of Krasner’s three ways in 
which states can exert power on other countries. By taking such a controversial step violating 
the privacy rights of US residents to combat money laundering, a desired achievement apart 
from cracking down on terrorist financing may have been to win top tier status, whereas less 
compliant countries would be further frowned on. Despite its range of application restricted to 
domestic actors, the Patriot Act can make things difficult for foreign actors that are 
economically dependent on the USA and whose AML level of ambition does not oblige to US 
requirements. Due to its infringements of civil liberties the Patriot Act has been object to 
sharp criticism even from FATF officials. This can and has led to precautious extradition of 
information to the USA from collaborating FIUs, thus it can in this sense be said to have 
defeated its own end31. This illustrates that although the USA in many respects uses its 
hegemonic power, it is misleading to claim that AML regime persistence exclusively can be 
explained by the hegemonic role of the USA. 
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 According to one of the interviewees, information is not provided to the USA unless it can be justified. 
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     Contributions of international AML to an international regime basically centre on the work 
of the FATF. Consistent with the expected findings, Krasner’s remaining two ways in which 
countries can exert power; regarding who decides who may participate in the game and who 
prepares policy frameworks, are maintained by the task force. Although new members have 
been added since its initiation, it is not an accidental ensemble of countries that has been 
invited to join the forum. There are countries interested in becoming members that are not 
welcomed; however, universal adherence to international standards is encouraged. As a forum 
put together by the G7 it was natural that these countries decided who should be invited to 
participate. These countries’ influence can be justified because they contribute largely to the 
financing of AML cooperation, which is also justified since the positioning of these countries 
as core industrialized states and major financial centres suggests that they are the largest 
beneficiaries of collaborated AML32. 
     The task force also holds the power to arrange AML policies. It has provided design of the 
regime, regime contents and objectives formulated by its recommendations, and outlined 
guidelines for administering the putting into practice of AML policies. FATF guidelines have 
also been implemented within the frameworks of cooperating bodies and organizations such 
as the EU and the UN. The procedures for ensuring compliance with FATF directions for 
behaviour are internationally agreed upon and are followed up by member and non-member 
countries, and this effecting of its recommendations despite its lack of executive power bears 
witness to the role of the forum as the chief executive of international AML. But keeping in 
mind that it is an international body consisting of many member countries holding different 
views on how things should be conducted, the question must be asked which countries within 
the FATF are most directive. The forum is backed by each member’s government and is as 
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 The sums passing through these countries and the expected extensiveness of money laundering within these 
nations naturally explains why these countries are particularly eager to overcome the problem.  
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already mentioned not an accidental composition of countries. Certainly, the decision making 
process is based on consensus, and members are evaluating each other on a regular basis, but 
its mandate thoroughly reflects the desires of the most influential actor. The 2000 black-
listing process illustrates this. But it also reflects the power constellations between the most 
powerful actors within the task force. When preparing the NCCT list Britain wanted to 
include Switzerland due to their financial secrecy provisions. Switzerland responded by 
claiming to make sure Britain was black listed if they were. Accordingly, a compromise 
between the two was entered into in which they agreed that both would remain off the list 
(Sharman, 2004:7). Moreover, the USA has been criticized by Germany for not meeting the 
requirements of knowing-your-customer. Although a US Senator admitted that Delaware had 
less compliant standards than some of the listed NCCTs, the German protest was clamped 
down and it was unthinkable that the USA should end up on the list (ibid). This is just another 
example supporting the argument that US hegemony is crucial in securing regime 
maintenance, although it can not be ascribed exclusively to the USA.  
4.4.2 The Benefits of Cooperation 
Despite the criticism of top-down policy strategies, maybe the use of power has served as a 
precursor both to establish a solid framework and create incentives for recognizing the 
benefits of cooperation. A desire to identify with highly compliant countries in order to gain 
acceptance from the international community offers incentives to adopt far-reaching AML 
policies. As one of the greatest fears of banking and other serious financial institutions is to 
obtain reputations for doing business with criminals, investing in AML is crucial. In 
comparison, the risk of being fined for not taking action seems trifling since these costs are 
minimal opposed to the expenditures of losing customers and business integrity. The fear of 
getting entangled in money laundering schemes therefore serves as a strait jacket, but may 
also be a threshold for reporting offences. Since financial business primarily is profit 
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motivated, and because this motive depends on customer confidence, an assessment must be 
conducted to estimate the costs of reporting the offence versus keeping quiet about it. But 
anyone choosing this strategy is faced with the risk of being charged with non-compliance. In 
turn, countries and jurisdictions that are housing non-compliant actors risk repercussions like 
restricted access to markets, as illustrated by the strategies conducted by the USA. As such 
AML is by many countries perceived as an unjust top-down policy. Increasingly however, as 
a growing number of laundering scandals and their effects have reached the headlines of 
international news magazines, optimistic attitudes towards compliance have been reinforced, 
and AML bodies are receiving positive feed-back from countries and financial institutions 
having admitted the advantages of compliance. The explanation to this is not found in a will 
to contribute to catch other countries’ crime perpetrators. Rather, next to the fear of losing 
respectability a growing number of countries realize the benefits of receiving assistance in 
catching their own bad guys. Countries suspecting that their financial institutions are 
extensively used in money laundering schemes have a self-interest in international 
cooperation in order to overcome their dilemma. Thus, common AML mechanisms, for 
instance international information sharing, may contribute to detect money laundering 
operations. This may be related to states’ self-interest in bringing back lost income kept in 
financial havens, a view rooted in the assumption that commercial motives are omnipresent. 
Countries fear competitive deregulation and a subsequent loss of mobile finance capital to 
foreign markets (Helleiner 1999:28). Governing a state is thus equated with running a 
business: loss of income requires countermeasures. Besides, vast sums of money kept in 
financial havens reduce the possibilities to maintain substantial social welfare systems. 
     Rather than reflecting countries’ profit motives, international AML must be seen as a 
response to a changing criminality picture33. Enhanced international engagement with AML 
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goes back to the 1980s and growing concerns with increased organized profit motivated 
crimes. At the 1989 Paris Summit, the G7 stressed the “urgent need for decisive action, both 
on a national and international basis to counter drug production, consumption and trafficking 
as well as laundering of its proceeds” (Gilmore 1999:79). Partly the AML campaign seeks to 
remove unfair competitive advantages for those conducting illegal business and to prevent 
criminals from obtaining influence in the financial system. Because money laundering is a 
cross-border activity countermeasures naturally have to be as impermeable as possible to 
avoid loopholes. The nucleus of the problem relates to enforcement authorities’ recognition 
that profits were not removed from criminals although they were sentenced. Traditional 
investigation and prosecution techniques were built on reactive methods requiring crime 
reporting before action could take place. Since this seemingly this did not succeed in making 
the crime less beneficial, these means for fighting profit motivated crimes were insufficient. 
Efficient crime combating subsequently needed to be rooted in proactive techniques based on 
financial investigation. This is a different way of thinking where legal offences are unveiled 
by receiving tips on suspicious activity. Intentionally, this will in turn contribute to remove 
the proceeds from criminals and consequently also their motivation to continue the business. 
Initiated by the Vienna Convention, this campaign was further enhanced by the creation of the 
Egmont Group and the FIU network when it was realized that the key to restrain dilatory 
prosecuting authorities was mutual international information sharing. Simultaneously, 
banking institutions experienced being fined for acting incautiously in relation to money 
laundering schemes. This was perceived as unjust since they were suspecting the ongoing 
crimes but had no options to report the offences due to professional secrecy rules. Action 
therefore needed to be taken to protect financial intermediaries from being associated with 
criminal activity. The initiative came with the launching of the Basle Committee Principles 
and shortly after by the creation of the FATF. Nothing illustrates that international AML 
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responds to a changing criminality picture better than the risk based approach adopted after 
September 11th 2001. The political environment after the terrorist attacks was left with the 
recognition that hitherto AML policies were not only insufficient, but the threat itself had 
changed. Focus therefore shifted from collecting evidence of financial crime to predict 
possible terrorist attacks through intensive electronic surveillance of financial activity. 
     The Wolfsberg Group initiative was also risk based, and stressed the benefits of identifying 
a common interest. In relation to the drafting of the Wolfsberg Principles, US and European 
banks had been convinced that a common AML standard was beneficial. At the early stages 
of international AML however, a rule based government approach based on a reactive, 
prescriptive strategy not universally suitable to all banking institutions was adopted. This led 
to uneven implementation of AML standards. Thus the Wolfsberg Group promoted a risk 
based approach designed and implemented in accordance with the specific needs and features 
of each banking institution (Pieth and Aiolfi 2003:6). Two leading banks made a first move 
by exchanging their policies which in turn formed a basis from which a common denominator 
was built. This kind of self-regulation resulted in convergence between regulators and the 
banking sector in developing AML strategies. 
     The indication of a common interest in collaborating against money laundering, whether in 
response to profit motives or a changing criminality picture, supports Keohane’s assumption 
that international regimes can persist in the absence of a hegemon. It was assumed that if this 
was the case, the three regime functions; mutual liability through recognized rules for 
behaviour, mutual information sharing and regime maintenance owing to cost reductions 
through comprehensive cooperation should be maintained by the FATF. Regarding regime 
maintenance, the AML nexus led by the FATF represents a solid apparatus for combating 
money laundering both in terms of policy frameworks and participation. This common 
denominator offer resource savings in terms of time, communication, information sharing and 
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decision making. Due to the costs of creating these standards, and since a common framework 
is more beneficial than negotiating several bilateral agreements, AML collaboration is likely 
to persist. Mutual liability is identified through the mutual evaluation procedures ensuring 
compliance with the 40 Recommendations. Mutual information sharing is encouraged by the 
40 Recommendations (recommendations 35-40). This may be done through legal assistance, 
by coordinating seizure proceedings, and by implementing international conventions34. The 
latter also serves as a carrot because share of confiscated assets is encouraged.   
     Mutual information sharing is also secured through the Egmont network of FIUs, and 
represents a factor which may encourage actors to overcome their reluctance to cooperate, 
consistent with interest based theories. By establishing the principle of mutual information 
sharing, an incentive for joining the AML campaign is created. International criminal 
networks conceal their proceeds in financial institutions that are not located in the country of 
crime commitment. This poses obstacles to investigation, thus the possibilities of receiving 
assistance in tracing the proceeds offered by mutual information sharing also serve as a carrot. 
Most countries facing the difficulties of detecting money laundering would be interested in 
providing information because they are interested in obtaining information due to the value of 
what can be received in return. However, traditions for information sharing are culturally 
embedded. For instance, as one of the leaders of a Moscow FIU is a former KGB agent, this 
person is bound to former national traditions of international cooperation and acts more 
reluctantly than others35. This contributes to impede the progress of mutual information flows 
with Russia. Time and learning must be provided for such traditions to change, yet this period 
of transition can not be long-lasting in order to avoid accuses of non-compliance. In this 
context, those possessing the authority to sanction non-compliant actors contribute to avoid 
situations exemplary of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
                                                
34
 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/40Recs-2003_en.pdf  
35
 Information based on an interview with an AML official, June 2004. 
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     Despite the recognition that AML collaboration is most beneficial, there are diverging 
opinions between countries on how to conduct collaboration. Because FATF power is 
represented not by one single country but by a group of countries having one equal vote each, 
the outcomes of cooperation can be object to bargaining between the most powerful actors. 
This is consistent with Keohane’s account and can be exemplified by the disagreements 
between Britain and Switzerland. Handing over responsibility to members countries through 
mutual evaluation procedures may contribute to evade the feeling of a top-down policy. More 
importantly, perceptions of participation as a common interest in order to evade problems 
related to the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation are created through this procedure. Because two 
countries subject to AML expect each other to choose competitive strategies and adopt a 
lower degree of compliance than required, they fail to pursue collaborative strategies and miss 
an optimal AML outcome. But mutual evaluation procedures prevent this dilemma. 
4.4.3 The Positioning of Knowledge in International AML 
“Cooperation can not be conducted unless there is consensus on the starting point” 
 -Else-Cathrine Lund, Økokrim 
Entering into multilateral AML agreements can be a controversial issue because decisions 
need to be made across different national regulations concerning criminal law, professional 
secrecy and traditions for cooperation36. This points to a social embedding of international 
AML and relates to knowledge based theories’ emphasis on how international relations arise 
as a reflection of the needs and interests of states and groups. Therefore, rationalist theories 
can be criticized for not taking into account that the countries, bodies and organizations 
involved in the project of collective prevention of money laundering consist of people with 
individual meanings. This can be illustrated by how AML professionals have influenced both 
application and design of technologies. For instance, rules of record keeping and suspicious 
                                                
36
 This was illustrated by the difficulties of getting information from a Moscow FIU and the disagreements 
between Switzerland and Britain in relation to the NCCT black-listing. 
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activity reporting rely on payment technologies as a source of information.  Technology 
design is exemplified by the electronic AML solutions implemented in Norway and the USA. 
This indicates that AML technologies are both formed by people’s needs as well as they are 
shaping people’s conduct, which is consistent with the accounts of Wyatt (1998) and 
Mackenzie and Wajcman (1998). 
     As indicated earlier in this thesis, the contribution of knowledge based theories to 
international AML should be expected found in an emphasis on consensus knowledge 
affecting AML policies. Consistent with Keohane, it has been demonstrated that this is not a 
precondition for cooperation if there exists a hegemon in international AML, and it has been 
illustrated that the FATF maintains the role of such a hegemon. However, this does not mean 
that international AML lacks consensus knowledge. On the contrary, the information retrieved 
from the empirical data collection reveals a strong emphasis on consensus knowledge, and 
this knowledge is rooted in information commonly shared and provided by a group of experts. 
It was also suggested that if international AML possesses the features of a technological 
system, possibly the concept of technical authority would have more explanatory value in 
describing the influence of expert knowledge on AML collaboration than epistemic 
communities. The linkages between international AML and a technological system have 
already been identified, thus technical authority should be more prevalent than epistemic 
communities. However, the distinction between these two is not that straightforward. Both 
concepts can be identified. Yet the one can be separated from the other in relation to AML 
before and after September 11th 2001: scientific knowledge exemplary of epistemic 
communities was prevalent before the terrorist attacks, while technical authority can be linked 
to AML after the terrorist attacks. Three examples can be listed to indicate the relevance of 
expert knowledge exemplary of epistemic communities in international AML. The FATF 
decision-making process brings together the policy-making power of legal, financial and law 
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enforcement experts, and the papers on which decisions are based are prepared by 
professionals. Second, the intension of the annual FATF typologies on recent money 
laundering (and since 2001 counter-terrorist financing) techniques is to provide material to 
help FATF policy makers develop AML standards. The typologies exercises are based on 
topics that have been agreed on by the FATF Plenary, rooted in countries’ experiences, and 
culminate in an expert meeting. The findings from this expert meeting in turn serve as a basis 
for the information spread to regulatory, FIU and law enforcement agencies, as well as to the 
general public37. Third, the SWIFT interbank reporting system is based on expert information 
collected from both public and private sectors including legal officials, financial institution 
authorities and software industry representatives in order to benefit from the knowledge held 
by the most specialised people in the world. The common denominator of these examples is 
that they are based on “transnational networks of specialists” exemplary of epistemic 
communities, and the experts referred to include scientists, law enforcement professionals, 
financial experts, diplomats as well as politicians.   
     As for the technical authority concept, this can be exemplified by how AML professionals 
defer to technology intensive models of risk assessment instead of relying exclusively on 
traditional sources of expert knowledge consistent with epistemic communities. This is 
particularly obvious in the risk based AML approach adopted after September 11th 2001.  
Expert knowledge is here safeguarded through scientific mathematical modelling on which 
“dataveillance” systems are built. FATF classifications can in this respect be said to have 
become computerized and integrated into these surveillance solutions, and as stated in de 
Goede (2004:12) “arguments, decisions, uncertainties and processual nature of decision-
making are hidden away inside a piece of technology”. Whereas Haas’ idea of scientific 
knowledge influencing AML policies includes social conventions irrespective whether they 
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 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/TY2004_en.PDF  
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have emerged out of scientific, cultural or political factors, technical authority relates more 
specifically to scientific knowledge which does not emphasize political opinions. Rather, in 
relation to electronic AML solutions these political opinions are embedded in the technology, 
and the technical authority offered by these solutions contributes to increase policy makers’ 
confidence in a technical expert industry which in turn influences AML policies: 
 Software installs relatively unchangeable, taken-for-granted protocols in the day-to-
day information practices of organizations, providing unified ways of interpreting 
events, influencing the ways in which decisions are made and standardizing such 
decisions over time and space (Leyshon & Thrift in de Goede 2004:13). 
 
 Yet this software can not be seen as independent of political ideas, since it was created in 
response to political needs. But by infiltrating such needs inside the software, perhaps 
technical authority can create perceptions of “objective” scientific knowledge. What secures 
the legitimacy of technical authority is its openness to peer review. Technical authority does 
not necessarily have to refer to technology. An example can be illustrated by directing 
attention to the FATF methodology for assessing compliance with the 40 Recommendations 
and the Eight Special Recommendations. It was developed in 2004 in collaboration with the 
IMF and the World Bank. Evidence of technical authority is that great effort was put in the 
design of a questionnaire attached to the methodology. Discussions were conducted in detail 
on the wording of the questionnaire to avoid that it was based on political opinions, in order 
to secure a common understanding of global standards for countries to adhere to38. In this 
sense, technical authority can contribute to increase confidence in the integrity and rightness 
of the source of rules and in turn establish consensually shared knowledge. This indicates 
another difference between technical authority and epistemic communities. Whereas the latter 
alludes to a top-down strategy with regard to the inclusion of political intensions, the former 
indicates a bottom-up strategy due to its alleged linkages to a de-emphasis on political 
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 Information based on an interview with an AML official, June 2004. 
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opinions and the openness to peer review which in this respect may create perceptions of 
scientific and not political knowledge. It has been demonstrated that expert knowledge 
exemplary of epistemic communities fits international AML before September 11th 2001, 
while technical authority is more relevant in explaining AML after the terrorist attacks. Yet 
the picture is not that unambiguous. This would mean that pre-September 11th AML was top-
down in nature and post-September 11th AML was a bottom-up strategy. A quick flashback to 
the dataveillance systems currently being conducted in the USA weigh heavily against a 
bottom-up strategy though. However, an increased reliance on technological solutions in 
international AML suggests that technical authority has emerged as a way of creating 
consensus knowledge influencing AML policies. But it does not mean that epistemic 
communities are obsolete.  
4.4.4 Path Dependence: the Predetermined Evolution of the Regime 
It has already been argued that the AML regime is likely to persist partly due to the cost 
reductions of collaborating versus negotiating several bilateral agreements. But regime 
persistence must in this issue area also be seen in relation to its interrelatedness between 
human and technical factors, and its path dependence regarding its specific technical 
evolution. International AML is built on policies, exemplified by rules of record-keeping and 
suspicious activity reporting, but more importantly there must be people to design and use 
these rules. A prerequisite to rule application is that there are skilled people to conduct 
requests of information processing within and between financial institutions. This is in turn 
depending on networked electronic funds transfer technologies. The efficiency of these 
networked technologies depend on transaction costs, networked computers and their 
appurtenant software and hardware, optical fibres as well as innovations in microchip mass-
production. Once these factors were established and carefully enmeshed in each other through 
coordination, international AML gained momentum as procedures for mutual behaviour were 
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put into practice. As such, the complexity and dynamics of international AML contributes to 
regime persistence. The crucial point is however that the evolution of the regime is bound to 
the problem underlying AML. As electronic payment technologies were first introduced, they 
were limited to banking institutions and were thus controllable. With the onset of financial 
liberalization and a subsequent universal application of financial sector payment technologies 
including internet banking and smart card usage however, the system has become more 
difficult to regulate and money launderers have been able to operate under circumstances in 
which their activities have been less likely to become unveiled. The momentum acquired by 
these technologies in turn serves as a necessary starting point of international AML. In order 
to attack money launderers where they are most vulnerable; at the placement stage, the 
dependence on these technologies (dataveillance solutions for instance) manifests itself. This 
is also evidence that international AML set out to solve a technical problem, which is one of 
Porter’s assumed ways in which regime formation can be influenced by technological 
systems. Moreover, it opposes rationalist theories’ emphasis on the choice among alternatives. 
In the context of international AML these choices are limited by the path dependence 
described above because AML professionals are “responding automatically to structural 
changes brought about by technological developments” (Porter 2003:531). The reasons for 
initiating enhanced action against money laundering were largely rooted in concerns with 
extensive use of the financial system for money laundering purposes. This indicates that the 
subsequent AML cooperation arose in response to such structural changes brought about by 
technological developments vulnerable to exploitation by criminals. International AML thus 
took on a form that was conditioned by the existing payment technologies.  
4.4.5 Regime Effectiveness 
It was indicated at the beginning of this chapter that for an international regime to have any 
relevance it must have some degree of effectiveness. International AML is only as successful 
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as the weakest link in the chain. The black-listing of NCCTs can be seen as a way of trying to 
secure AML efficiency. Williams & Baudin O’Hayon (2001:139) maintain that some of the 
participating countries and jurisdictions are in practice “part of the problem rather than part of 
the solution”. Relating to weak and criminal states, whether tied to domestic problems like 
unstable regimes, civil war, famine and the like, or corrupt states that simply rely on market 
survival by supporting criminal business39, such countries hamper effective AML. Many 
countries within these categories also perceive international AML as a top-down policy from 
multilateral bodies acting on a level superior to their national governments. The irony of such 
a top-down policy is that less compliant countries often found in weak, corrupt or criminal 
states are easily stigmatized as the worst offenders whereas shortcomings within supposedly 
highly compliant member countries are toned down. For instance, a newspaper article from 
Norway shows that a sampling test to inspect compliance carried out in February 2004, 
reveals that out of twelve highly profiled financial institutions, only two could document 
satisfactory record keeping procedures, and only two had sufficient routines for personnel 
training40. The admitted deficiencies of US domestic AML policies in relation to the 
launching of the naming and shaming list in 2000 also illustrates this.  
     According to Williams and Baudin-O’Hayon (2002:141) international AML is bound to 
inefficiency because of a FATF tendency to exalt form over substance by operating with 
procedural norms and standards before substantive norms with real impact. Achievements of 
international AML should however prove this perception wrong. On the contrary, the task 
force is perhaps the only international AML body that does hold substance, which can be 
illustrated by the putting into practice of the Vienna Convention and the Basle Committee 
Statement of Principles. It is in any case too early to conclude that international AML is 
inefficient. Passing laws to implement international AML standards is not a time consuming 
                                                
39
 Nauru is one of the six FATF NCCTs and lives largely by protecting proceeds from the Russian mafia. 
40
  Dagens Næringsliv, 10.06.04 (http://avis.dn.no/). Retrieved on June 10th 2004.  
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issue as opposed to putting these into practise. The regulatory framework has only been 
around for a short period of time, thus the effects in terms of increased detection, confiscation 
and conviction can not be expected revealed before international regulations have been 
allowed to function in practice. Taking the social and cultural embedding of behavioural 
change into consideration this process will not take place over night. Without the contribution 
of the FATF there would be no AML regime. By bringing international conventions and 
directives into practice the FATF makes sure that the effort to curtail money laundering is 
more but a mere paper mill.  
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5 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary 
This thesis has demonstrated how electronic payment technologies can be used both to 
facilitate and fight money laundering. Major laundering techniques have been described, and 
important AML bodies and AML techniques have been accounted for. Apart from this, the 
research question behind this thesis was to decide if it exists an international AML regime 
which also possessed the features of a technological system, and how this affected AML. The 
thesis was introduced with a story from the real world revealing how corrupt banking sector 
executives assisted extensive money laundering schemes in relation to the Bank of New York 
scandal in the late 1990s. Unfortunately, it symbolizes the relevance of the topic and 
illustrates the presence of this crime in the financial sector. But more importantly, it illustrates 
why it is necessary to mobilise countermeasures. It has been demonstrated that collaborated 
international money laundering countermeasures can be labelled an international regime. An 
account was developed which maintains that international AML has linkages to a 
technological system, and that the features of this technological system influences AML 
policies. It turned out that the relevance of the different theoretical approaches must be seen in 
relation to different stages of international AML. Regime formation was explained by the 
hegemonic power of the USA at the early stages of international AML, but several incidents 
indicated that the USA also used its power to secure other countries’ compliance with 
international standards in later stages of the regime process, thus the USA contributes to 
regime maintenance. Despite criticism of a partly top-down policy from multilateral bodies 
controlled by the core of industrialized countries, is seems like an increasing number of 
countries are starting to recognize the benefit of collaborating against money laundering. The 
reasoning for this includes several factors: the fear of losing respectability which in turn 
severely affects business contributes to explain countries’ compliance with AML standards. 
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The benefits of receiving international assistance in catching crime perpetrators also serve as 
an incentive to adopt AML standards. This can be related to a desire of bringing back lost tax 
income kept in financial havens. But international AML must also be seen as a response to a 
changing criminality picture which requires corresponding countermeasures. It was argued 
that the AML regime can persist in absence of a hegemonic power, and important regime 
functions are maintained by the FATF. The role of knowledge in international AML was 
discussed, and in this context the concept of scientific knowledge exemplary of epistemic 
communities was opposed to the technical authority concept related to technological systems. 
A distinction can be made between the two regarding their relevance. It was determined that 
the former is suitable for explaining expert influence on AML policies before the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th 2001, whereas expert knowledge derived from technical authority 
best describes expert influence on international AML after this incident. It was stressed that 
this does not mean that epistemic communities are obsolete. The terrorist attacks symbolize a 
watershed in international AML. Whereas countermeasures previously focused on tracing 
criminal money after crime commitment, AML after September 11th 2001 is built on a risk 
based surveillance strategy seeking to predict possible terrorist attacks. Regime persistence 
can as mentioned partly be explained by US power. But an explanation was provided 
illustrating that the AML regime also is likely to persist due to its complexity and the cost 
reductions of operating out of a common starting point. Yet regime maintenance must be 
viewed in light of its path dependence in the sense that the natural AML starting point was 
conditioned by the technologies underlying money laundering, and that it therefore also is 
bound to follow its specific evolution. Although power politics are still in force, collaboration 
within this regime is largely technical in nature. Regarding regime effectiveness, it was 
argued that it is too early to draw the conclusion if international AML is efficient or not. The 
AML nexus entails an extensive regulatory framework which has been developed in the 
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course of less than two decades. Thus time must be provided to let these regulations function 
in practice before the results of collaboration in terms of seizure and confiscation can be 
expected.  
5.2 Implications 
Despite important achievements, the AML nexus has been object to criticism. What best 
illustrates this is the USA Patriot Act and its subsequent controversial infringement of civil 
rights in relation to financial surveillance strategies. It was argued that the concept of 
technical authority has the potential for establishing consensus knowledge by creating 
perceptions of a bottom-up strategy influencing AML policies. However, although US 
citizens would agree that the threat posed by terrorism legitimizes more far-reaching 
countermeasures, as illustrated by the dataveillance systems this consensus is not publicly 
shared. The difference between AML requirements before and after the terrorist attacks in 
New York and Washington is that policy makers now are willing to adopt drastic measures 
even if this entails violation of the civil rights of its people. AML/anti-terrorist standards 
subject to the Patriot Act are therefore involuntarily adopted. 
     The FATF naming and shaming strategy was abandoned in 2003 and replaced by a more 
inclusive audit conducted by the IMF, built on voluntariness. The fact that more than 100 
countries shortly after addressed the IMF requesting assistance in establishing AML policies 
may indicate that countries increasingly are acknowledging the benefits of adhering to 
international standards. But more importantly, although the black-listing of NCCTs 
undoubtedly was efficient, the IMF audit might contribute to reduce perceptions of a top-
down policy. 
     These two implications call for the importance of finding a legitimate balance between 
what it takes to combat money laundering and terrorist financing effectively and how far one 
is willing to go in reaching that goal. The IMF experience suggests that a strategy based on 
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voluntariness where participants actively seek advice on how to reach compliance with 
international standards is a more legitimate way of conducting collaboration as opposed to 
sanctioning methods. This bottom-up strategy supports the assumption that regime 
maintenance is rooted in a common interest, although the USA highly conducts the AML 
campaign. It can however be asked if a certain degree of coercion perhaps is necessary in 
order to create deterrence and general prevention effects, exemplified by increased concerns 
with financial reputation and international acceptance. In any case, this is an issue area which 
requires research on the actual follow-up of AML standards. The sampling test of twelve 
Norwegian financial institutions revealed that a country which is otherwise devoted to 
international requirements failed to fulfil its obligations. Not only does this require research 
on follow-up, but also follow-up of financial institutions in itself. This in turn is a resource 
demanding task in terms of people, time and money, but initiating an extensive offensive 
against money laundering and terrorist financing can not be successful if regulative 
frameworks are not followed up at the other end.  
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Appendix A: List of Abbreviations 
 
 
AML  Anti-money Laundering 
BIS   Bank for International Settlements 
ESST  European Inter-University Association on Society, Science and Technology 
EU  European Union 
FATF   Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering 
FIU   Financial Intelligence Unit 
FSF  Financial Stability Forum 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GPML  Global Programme against Money Laundering 
G7  Group of Seven 
ICT  Information and communication technologies 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
NCCT  Non-cooperative Countries and Territories 
OECD  Organization foe Economic Cooperation and Development 
OFC  Offshore Financial Centres  
PC  Personal Computer 
SCOT  Social Construction of Technology 
STS  Science, Technology and Society 
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications System  
UN   United Nations 
UNODC  United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
US  United States 
USA   United States of America 
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Appendix B: List of Interviewees 
 
 
• Representative from the SAS Institute AS:  
Director of Strategy and Business Development Dr.Sc. Inge Krogstad 
 Interviewed on June 1st 2004. 
 
 
• Former Representative from the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and 
Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime:  
Senior Consultant Geir Olderbakk  
 Interviewed on June 2nd 2004. 
 
 
• Representative from the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway:  
Special Adviser Rune Grundekjøn  
 Interviewed on June 8 2004.  
 
 
• Representative from Accenture, Finance and Performance Management:  
Associate Partner Anne Steen 
 Interviewed on June 11 2004. 
 
 
• Representative from the Norwegian Financial Services Association:  
Deputy Director Hans-Jacob Anonsen 
 Interviewed on June 17 2004. 
 
 
• Representative from the Ministry of Justice and the Police and the Norwegian FATF 
delegate: Deputy Assistant Secretary General Anne-Mette Dyrnes 
Interviewed on June 21 2004. 
 
 
• Representative from the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and 
Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime:  
Police Prosecutor Else-Cathrine Lund 
  Interviewed on June 28 2004.  
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Appendix C: Definition of Financial Institutions 
 
“Financial institutions” means any person or entity who conducts as a business one or more 
of the following activities or operations for or on behalf of a customer:  
1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public.  
2. Lending. 
3. Financial leasing. 
4. The transfer of money or value. 
5. Issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, cheques, 
traveller's cheques, money orders and bankers' drafts, electronic money).  
6. Financial guarantees and commitments.  
7. Trading in:  
a. money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs, derivatives etc.);  
b. foreign exchange;  
c. exchange, interest rate and index instruments;  
d. transferable securities;  
e. commodity futures trading.  
8. Participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such 
issues.  
9. Individual and collective portfolio management.  
10. Safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons.  
11. Otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other 
persons.  
12. Underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance. 
13. Money and currency changing.  
  
Source: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/40Recs_en.htm#Financial%20institutions  
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